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Executive summary 
This report aims at providing an overview of the literature debate 
addressing the Better Regulation Agenda adopted by the European 
Commission in 2015 (henceforth, also indicated as BR 2015)1.  
The review, which focuses on peer-reviewed and grey literature published 
from 2015 onwards, has been structured according to the following major 
areas: i) evidence-based policy-making, including methodology and 
quantification; ii) integrated policy cycle (including Impact Assessments, IA, 
and evaluation2); iii) stakeholder consultation, participation and 
involvement; iv) level of regulation, including REFIT; v) regulatory scrutiny 
and quality assurance; vi) transparency in policy making; vii) inter-
institutional relations; viii) subsidiarity and proportionality. For each of these 
areas, the main messages of the various authors on achievements, 
remaining issues and what can be further improved have been identified, 
analysed and brought together. More general issues referring to the BR 2015 
have also been reported. 
What emerges is a complex picture. The relevant academic fields are 
political science, public administration, and law. The debate addresses a wide 
range of aspects, from the technical to the political level. The presence of 
little consensus in some cases, together with the still scarce empirical 
evidence, makes a synthesis very challenging3.  
In general, the great majority of the papers welcomes one or more 
aspects of the BR 2015. These are notably the commitment to evidence-
based policy making, the attempt at closing the policy cycle by paying more 
attention to the evaluation phase, the increased responsiveness to 
stakeholders, a greater role of scrutiny, transparency, consideration for 
subsidiarity.  
At the same time, all authors also underline various still existing issues, 
make observations on what can be further improved and stress that what 
can be achieved concretely will depend on actual implementation.  
The text that follows summarizes the main elements of the literature debate. 
Evidence-based policy-making, including methodology and 
quantification 
• In general, authors welcome the European Commission's (EC) 
commitment to a sound use of evidence for all policy making 
activities. The attempt to provide practical coherent guidance via the 
BR guidelines and toolbox is also welcomed, as well as the 
consideration of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.  
• However, some authors also note that such a rich toolbox still allows 
for a variety of practices and that a consolidated methodological 
framework is somehow missing. Difficulties in quantification, notably 
on the benefits of regulatory intervention, are also observed. 
• The literature highlights that appropriate standards to select and 
weigh evidence should be further developed, and additional support 
and guidance on methodological aspects should be provided, by 
considering also the European Union’s (EU) vision for the medium and 
                                           
(1) European Commission (2015).  
(2) Consistently with the terminology used in the BR 2015, we here use the term 'Impact 
Assessment' (IA) to indicate ex-ante analysis and 'evaluation' for ex-post analysis. 
(3)  In addition, in some cases, the technical meaning of the terminology used might also be 
different in the various contributions. 
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long term. Some authors also suggest promoting a strengthened in-
house capacity of the EC, as well as external peer-review 
mechanisms. 
Integrated policy cycle  
• The BR 2015 is regarded by authors as a step forward for the EU in 
closing the policy cycle and becoming a leading example of good 
regulatory governance worldwide. The new BR Guidelines are found to 
be broader in scope and more user-friendly than the previous ones, 
providing guidance throughout the policy cycle (specific messages on 
evaluations and IAs are reported in Box 1 and Box 2, respectively). 
• However, some authors also express concerns on how strong actually 
the link between IAs and evaluations is and how much the 
information they provide is fully embedded in the decision-making 
process. These authors mention in particular the limited use of IAs in 
evaluations and of evaluations in IAs; the better institutionalisation of 
the IA process with respect to evaluation; the influence of political 
timetables; lack of coverage of 'comitology' and insufficient account 
for the mainstreaming objectives4 defined in the EU treaties.   
• The literature highlights the need for focusing on producing effective 
support to policy-making rather than on meeting procedural 
requirements: IA and evaluation documents should be kept 
accessible, understandable and useful for decision-makers. Some 
authors underline that coordination between evaluation and IA work 
should be ensured in a consistent cyclical approach, and that the 
‘evaluate first’ principle should be more prominently enforced.  
Box 1. Evaluation 
Authors welcome the EC’s commitment to a systematic, high-quality policy 
evaluation, which has been extended from financial to regulatory 
instruments, and to comprehensive ‘fitness checks’. Its participatory 
dimension has also been strengthened.  
At the same time, some authors also express concerns on the scope and 
focus of policy evaluations, on data limitations and on the methodological 
quality. The timing dimension needs to be taken into account: if evaluations 
are too early, their results might not be conclusive, but if they are too late 
they could miss the possibility to influence the next programme round. This 
also renders difficult temporal alignment with IAs.  Some papers claim poor 
use of evaluation and insufficient follow-up and stress that review and 
evaluation clauses should clearly define and ensure the accompanying data 
collection at Member State (MS) level. Methodological coherency and quality 
need to be ensured.  
 
                                           
(4) A political objective is said to be 'mainstreamed' when it becomes horizontally applicable 
across all policy areas. 
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Box 2. Impact Assessment 
The literature recognizes that the use of IAs has been extended and further 
consolidated, and that quality has improved. 
However, in the debate it is also argued that there is no clear definition of 
which initiatives should be subject to IA and what constitutes a substantial 
amendment prompting an additional IA. It is also unclear if and how IAs 
genuinely inform the development of the proposals. Some authors report 
quality weaknesses, such as the tendency to prepare a justification for a 
predetermined preferred option, as well as insufficient coverage of certain 
impacts regarding objectives included in the EU Treaties (such as consumer 
and environmental protection).  
For both IA and related supporting studies, these authors call for 
transparency on data, assumptions and methodology, and for a balanced 
implementation of methods that consistently assess and quantify monetary 
and non-monetary impacts. 
Stakeholders consultation, participation and involvement 
• The literature recognizes that the BR 2015 strengthens stakeholder 
involvement commitments and their implementation: consultation is 
extended to more types of EU legislation and to every stage of the 
policy cycle. This process provides the opportunity for new 
information to be gathered by the EC, contributing to better insights 
into stakeholders' positions. 
• Some authors however also observe that current procedures generate 
a somehow high workload on stakeholders and the EC itself, but it is 
difficult to verify how this affects policy making activities. They also 
note that participation in consultations is often confined to the actors 
already having access to the political process, therefore providing 
limited added value. In the questionnaires, there is little room for free 
input. The analysis of results is also questioned (for example, either 
because it only relies on statistical analysis, or, on the other extreme, 
because it is purely qualitative) as well as the lack of clear 
commitment on their use in policy-making activities.  
• The literature highlights that consultations should be designed as 
effectively as possible to ensure early and balanced stakeholder input. 
The need for additional guidance about methodologies for analysing 
the results is also observed by some authors.  
Level of regulation, including REFIT 
• The literature welcomes the prominent role given by the BR 2015 to 
improving EU legislation by a more streamlined legislative activity, 
promoting reinforced criteria and procedures to ensure the quality of 
regulation. The REFIT agenda can help identifying overlaps and 
inconsistencies, while the REFIT Platform is an explicit 
institutionalisation of participation.  
• However, some authors also note that the rhetoric of the EC is 
focused much more on costs than benefits: the real issue is instead 
whether legislation ultimately brings benefits that outweigh the costs. 
Some authors found that the rationale of the REFIT programme is 
unclear, and its methodological foundations shaky, while the platform 
has a narrow focus on reducing regulatory burden. Some authors also 
see the risks of a possible ‘deregulation’ policy agenda. It is also 
noted that regulatory streamlining is not simply a technical matter, 
but involves making political choices. Some authors also claim that, 
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by formulating (and possibly without sufficient evidence) that ‘EU 
over-regulation’ is an issue, the BR 2015 indeed feeds the existence 
of the very problem it intends to solve.  
• The literature observes that less costly alternatives can also be 
considered to reduce the level of EU regulation. Some authors also 
suggest engaging in positive public relations campaigns about the 
benefits of EU regulation.  
Regulatory scrutiny and quality assurance 
• Authors welcome the renewed composition and dedicated personnel 
of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), which promise to enhance its 
independence. Its opinion adds transparency and flags up issues to be 
considered in the legislative procedure. The extension of scrutiny also 
to evaluations gives a more holistic approach to quality control 
mechanisms. 
• However, in the literature it is also noted that the RSB retains the 
character of an ‘in-house’ body, and that, considering the amount of 
work done, it is not adequately supported by a dedicated secretariat 
and team of economists and social scientists. Moreover, some authors 
question that the mandate for the scrutiny of evaluations is less 
systematic than the one for IAs. On quality assurance, some authors 
note that there is no judicial scrutiny over the obligation to respect BR 
principles and also that, in the absence of agreed indicators, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions about BR performance. 
• Some authors express the opinion that RSB should scrutinise IAs 
earlier in the process and not just the ‘end products’. It is also noted 
that in IAs it should be stated clearly if a political decision is made to 
continue despite a negative opinion of the RSB.  
Transparency in policy making 
• The literature recognises that BR 2015 strives to open up EU policy-
making for public participation, and therewith to make the EU more 
transparent and accountable. The Interinstitutional Agreement on 
Better Law-Making (IIA)5 increases the transparency of the pre-
legislative process. 
• However, in the literature it is also highlighted that further 
improvement is needed. For example, some authors claim that it is 
not easy to obtain a complete picture of all ongoing and completed EU 
evaluations (and of the respective link to the review clauses), and 
that the access to original studies is sometimes difficult.  For IAs, it is 
claimed that the internal nature of the draft report makes it difficult to 
determine its actual influence on the proposal. Lack of transparency is 
also reported in input data, calculations and modelling, as well as in 
key data and findings’ presentation.  
• Some authors propose that EU institutions and MSs commit to 
providing information throughout the whole policy cycle, namely on 
the evidence in support to evaluations and IAs.  
Interinstitutional relations 
• The literature considers the IIA an essential part of the BR 2015, by 
confirming a procedural framework of interinstitutional cooperation to 
                                           
(5) European Parliament, Council of the European Union and European Commission (2016). 
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progress in the direction of more effective EU legislation. Some 
authors note that BR tools are now increasingly used by the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Council.  
• Some authors also note that the EC wants to ensure that 
responsibilities for inefficiency of regulatory outcomes are separate 
(i.e., to make clear when higher compliance costs are generated by 
the EP, the Council or the MSs). Other authors observe that the 
Council and the EP still lack political ownership of the evaluative 
mechanisms. In this respect, they notice that the European 
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) is actively involved in 
analysing EC’s IAs, but not yet in assessing amendments proposed by 
EP committees, and that, while the Council is increasingly using EC 
IAs, so far it has failed to develop its own capacity. Authors also note 
that the final version of the IIA was heavily watered down, as for 
example, IAs on amendments are not mandatory anymore. 
• Some authors suggest advancing in the implementation of the IIA, to 
include a procedure to structure the oversight of legislation and, in 
parallel, to respect the place of the consultative bodies6 as part of the 
EU institutional design.  
Subsidiarity and proportionality 
• Authors see the BR 2015 as a possibility to broaden the application of 
subsidiarity and proportionality principles. In particular, IAs could be 
a useful guidance to conceptualize these principles in the judicial 
review of the EU legislation. 
• However, some of them regret that evidence use and a systemic 
vision are still lacking. In IAs, they find that the respect for the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is not underpinned by 
evidence-based instruments. Some authors also report lack of 
overarching vision of the role of co- and self-regulation and argue 
that National Parliaments (NPs) occupy a fairly peripheral place in the 
BR 2015.  
• Some of the reviewed papers propose that the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) should further recognize the BR 2015 as 
establishing the guidelines on how to conceptualise proportionality 
and subsidiarity. More specifically, they suggest that in IAs the 
subsidiarity and proportionality analysis should be improved by using 
sound evidence; that all soft law initiatives could be subject to IA to 
better serve both subsidiarity and democracy; that the role of NPs 
should be strengthened.  
Concluding remarks  
• The literature emphasizes that assessing the BR 2015 is a challenging 
task not only because of the difficulty of evaluating policies aiming at 
better regulatory quality, but also, notably, due to its complex nature 
and, not least, the relatively short implementation period. 
• The OECD defines the EU as the most ambitious regional regulatory 
co-operation framework involving supra-national regulatory powers. 
Indeed, the great majority of the papers reviewed welcome the 
ambition of the reform and one or more specific aspects.  
                                           
(6) Committee of the Regions and European Economic and Social Committee. 
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• The debate appears to be extremely varied. Some authors observe 
that the term 'better' implies an evaluation element, but this does not 
automatically ensure high quality, or even that the notion of 
regulatory quality is accepted by every player. For example, 
regulation can be ‘better’ because it conforms to the political 
preferences of citizens or because it meets certain technical 
standards. Other authors underline that the complaints about the (too 
high or too low) level of EU regulation are often of a political nature, 
while EU institutions prefer a ‘neutral’ approach. Authors also note 
various inherent tensions and dilemmas in the BR 2015 approach. A 
few go even further and argue that the BR 2015 operates based on 
possibly unproven assumptions, generates administrative burden and 
may overlook certain negative impacts.   
• Some authors underline the importance of more widely 
communicating actions taken within the BR framework, and of 
developing a renewed narrative which highlights the benefits of EU 
regulation. They also acknowledge that success of the BR depends, 
ultimately, on effective and constructive co-operation from all of the 
actors participating in and benefitting from policy-making.  
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Introduction 
This literature review aims at providing an overview of how the Better 
Regulation Agenda adopted by the European Commission (EC) in May 2015 
(henceforth, also indicated as BR 2015)7 has been perceived and discussed.  
The review takes into account peer review and grey literature from 2015 
onwards8 and is structured around the main highlights of the BR 2015 as 
follows: 
1. Evidence-based policy-making, including methodology and 
quantification; 
2. Integrated policy cycle; 
3. Stakeholder consultation, participation and involvement ; 
4. Level of regulation, including REFIT; 
5. Regulatory Scrutiny and quality assurance; 
6. Transparency in policy making in the context of BR; 
7. Inter-institutional relations in the context of BR; 
8. Subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of BR. 
Based on this conceptual scheme, for each of the above mentioned topics the 
main achievements, remaining issues and overarching remarks are 
presented. While the 'issues' refer to concrete and specific aspects of the 
topic at stake, the 'overarching remarks' refer to more general, systemic 
questions which in fact refer more broadly to the overall BR 2015 approach. 
Finally, we also report the observations9 made by the authors on what 
could be further improved10. Concluding remarks on the BR 2015 package 
are reported in the final section. 
The length of the sections referring to the various topics can be assumed, in 
a way, to be a reflection of the interest relative to these topics. The 
messages can of course refer to more than one topic; whenever possible, 
this has been clearly indicated. 
The analysis aims at addressing explicitly the changes introduced in the 
BR in 2015, but more general and pre-existing issues, if relevant, have also 
been included11.  
                                           
(7) European Commission (2015).  
(8)  The list of references includes academic papers, reports from international organizations 
(OECD), scrutinising bodies (European Parliament, European Court of Auditors) and Think 
Tanks.  
(9)  Observations are only those formulated explicitly by the authors (they have not been 
extrapolated from the issues and challenges they mention). 
(10)  Citations are kept as close as possible to the original language of the papers, although no 
brackets are used to avoid overburdening of the text. In many cases, authors either cite or 
endorse claims made by other authors. Simple quoting is not reported further. In the case 
of endorsement, the claims are reported also under the name of the author making the 
endorsement. 
(11)  This is the case, for example, for comments related to IAs, for which the distinction 
between issues before and after the BR 2015 is somehow more blurred with respect to the 
stronger changes introduced for evaluations. 
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To focus on the changes introduced by the BR 2015, the literature search 
includes only publications issued from 2015 onwards (the last update was 
made in September 2018).  
The details on the criteria for the literature search are reported in Annex 1.  
Overall, 76 papers have been included in the review. Figure 1 and 2 show 
their distribution over the years and their subdivision according to topics. 
Figure 1. Distribution over the years of the publications included in the review 
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Figure 2. Number of publications included in the literature review addressing the various aspects of the BR Agenda 
(one paper can refer to more than one topic). Details in Annex 2  
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The papers revised cover a wide spectrum. Although it would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to attempt at a clear cut classification, the 
following main categories can be identified: 
1. Assessment of the past system: these papers present issues that 
may already have been addressed by the BR 2015. In these cases, we 
have retained only those elements which are found to be still relevant 
in the current debate.   
2. Theoretical assessment of the new system with expectations, 
which may or may not manifest. In these cases, we tried to indicate 
transparently that those made are in fact claims and expectations 
rather than empirical assessments. Many relevant publications were 
in fact issued immediately following the communication on the BR 
2015. They pointed at its positive and negative characteristics, taking 
the form of analytical discussions consisting of comments and claims. 
3. Assessment of the performance of the new system. 
Unfortunately, overall, empirical studies12 turn out to be limited in 
number. The short implementation period of the BR 2015 could be 
one of the reasons why empirical analysis is still scarce. In fact, in 
most cases, empirical analyses refer also to the years before 2015.  If 
relevant, these papers have also been taken into account13, since 
they constitute an important benchmark for future studies on the BR 
2015 both for their methodology and for their findings.  
Finally, a clarification on the terminology is needed14. Throughout the 
text, in accordance with the BR 2015, we used the terms Impact 
Assessment (IA) to indicate ex-ante analysis and evaluation for ex-post 
analysis. In this respect, we note the considerable variation in the terms 
used in the literature. Even the choice made by the EC is addressed in the 
debate (see, for example, Smismans, 2015). To improve the readability of 
the report, we have decided to follow the BR 2015 terminology and, if 
needed and possible, we have substituted the terminology used in the 
various papers with the one used by the EC15. 
 
                                           
(12)  Details on the empirical studies are reported in Annex 3. 
(13) For the sake of clarity, the reference period of the analysis is indicated the first time an 
empirical study is recalled in the text. 
(14) It should also be noted that, in general, the technical meaning of the terminology used 
might then be different in the various contributions, possibly also because they refer to 
different academic fields (see Annex 1). Where possible, this has been made explicit.  
(15) Concretely, this means, for example, that the term 'ex-post analysis' has been substituted 
by 'evaluation'; that 'ex-ante impact assessment' or 'integrated impact assessment' or 'ex-
ante evaluation' have been substituted by 'IA'; and so on. The few exceptions to this rule 
have been highlighted in the text. 
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1 Evidence-based policy-making: methodology and 
quantification16  
1.1 [Achievements] The Commission commits to a sound 
use of evidence for all policy making activities… 
1. The BR 2015 represents a step forward for regulatory reform and 
signals that the European Union (EU) cares deeply about good 
governance and wants policy making to be effective and evidence-
based, potentially taking a world leadership role (Broughel 2015). 
2. This is a clear step towards the completion of a fully evidence-
backed policy cycle (Renda 2015). The EC is prepared to be judged 
on the quality and usage of evidence-based instruments in all its 
activities (Radaelli 2018).  
3. Discussions leading up to the formal consultation are well 
informed by evidence. IAs are being more systematically reviewed 
by the European Parliament (EP) and Council, and have also been 
used by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as 
supporting evidence for certain judgements (Golberg 2018)17. 
4. There is a single set of methodological templates (Radaelli 2018). 
5. The toolbox provides extensive and adequate guidance on the 
quantification of costs and benefits (Renda 2017b)18. 
6. There are attempts to include more social validity, more 
behavioural insights and legal validity into IAs (Purnhagen and 
Feindt 2015), as for example strategic foresight within the Joint 
Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC) (OECD 2018). 
7. Compared to the US, the EU is less focused on monetization 
exercises and more receptive to qualitative variables and the 
need for sound policy judgment in the assessment process19 
(Parker and Alemanno 2015). 
8. There is a greater recognition of the role that good regulation can 
play in driving up productivity, wages, and living standards. 
Competitiveness impacts must now be considered at all times. The 
new requirements create the potential for a new landscape for risk 
management decision-making to emerge (Meads and Allio 2015). 
                                           
(16)  It shall be noted that different authors might attach different meanings to 'evidence', which 
could, for example, include or not the results of stakeholders’ consultations. 
(17)  Golberg (2018) examines the performance of the EC BR approach by looking at available 
evidence on the quality and relevance/use of its outputs. She quotes various reports and 
other documents issued by the EU institutions, as well as studies carried out by external 
actors and authors.    
(18)  Renda (2017b) explores the methodological and political feasibility of 14 possible options for 
the setting of net reduction targets on regulatory costs in Europe. See Annex 3 for details. 
(19)  Parker and Alemanno (2015) mostly refer to before BR 2015 implementation.  
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9. The adoption of systematic IAs fostered a cultural change within the 
EC (De Feo 2017; Golberg 2018).  
10. Organising evidence gathering within the bureaucracy facilitates 
learning (Smismans 2015). 
1.2 [Issues] …but methodological aspects need to be 
addressed  
1. Existing BR guidelines and standards for scientific evidence lag global 
best practices (Meads and Allio 2015). 
2. It remains uncertain what type and amount of evidence should be 
considered, who will provide the evidence, and how evidence will be 
taken into account (Ranchordas 2017).  
3. There is a residual lack of transparency in selecting evidence, 
since the BR Guidelines do not force the authors to disclose the 
methodology used (Hines 2016). However, Meuwese (2017) notes 
that the BR Toolbox does contain a requirement for an annex to the 
IA to explain which evidence has been used. 
4. Difficulties in quantification emerge in IA and evaluations due to 
lack of data and the need for appropriate methods that would allow 
for a proportionate assessment of costs and benefits (RSB SG and 
JRC Working Group 2018). 
5. Clear conclusions cannot always be drawn from the evidence 
contained in evaluations and IAs (De Feo 2017). 
6. The shift from project and programme assessment to broader policy 
appraisal requires addressing methodological aspects20 
(Smismans 2015), namely: 
(a) There are important uncertainties related to methodology 
used in IAs, for example, when cost-benefit or multi-criteria 
analysis would be more appropriate (Renda 2015; Renda 2016; 
Renda 2017a)21. The very rich toolbox offered by the BR 
Guidelines allows for a variety of practices across the EC 
Directorates General (DGs), as well as for varying degrees of 
quantification and monetisation of impacts (Renda 2017a). The 
'checklist' for assessing impacts is getting ever longer (Smismans 
2015).  
(b) Tools and methodology for evaluation are less readily available 
(Smismans 2015). Evaluation is a complex activity, in which most 
of the OECD countries have just raised awareness (OECD, 2014 
cited in Radaelli 2018). 
                                           
(20)  For details on recurring quality issues in evaluations and IA see section 2. 
(21)  Renda (2016) analyses 53 IAs conducted in the financial sector in the years 2003-2011. See 
Annex 3 for details. 
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(c) Given the different types of approaches (cost-benefit analysis, 
multi-criteria analysis, etc.) that are applied, there is 
insufficient consistency to facilitate meaningful 
aggregation of either costs or benefits (Golberg 2018). 
i. The BR does not require cost-benefit analysis, differently 
from American executive agencies which show a somewhat 
better record in producing fully monetised assessments 
(Golberg 2018).  
ii. However, the cost-benefit analysis command has long been 
criticized.  The BR 2015 makes welcome attempts to include 
more social validity, more behavioural insights and legal 
validity. However, despite the EC’s communicated intentions to 
develop 'a common approach' for IA, a consolidated 
framework is lacking (Purnhagen and Feindt 2015). 
iii. Counterfactual analysis is not systematically done (Golberg 
2018). 
iv. Too little enthusiasm for quantitative targets, indicators of 
regulatory quality and strong commitment to a method or 
another contrast with the OECD’s Framework for 
Regulatory Evaluation (Radaelli and Schrefler 2015). 
v. There is an implicit bias towards the techno-scientific 
knowledge. This for example is implied by gathering as much 
quantitative evidence as possible (Hines 2016). 
(d) Autonomous choices of Member States on implementation 
and enforcement and little comparable EU-wide data make it 
difficult to quantify ex-ante costs and benefits (Golberg 2018). 
7. Given the increased workload, the availability of EC staff with the 
right competences can be questioned (Renda 2015; Renda 2016).  
8. The new EC’s interest in promoting BR has not resulted in more 
concerted effort by policy-makers in the EP and the EC to promote 
risk-informed policy-making (Lofstedt and Schlag 2017). 
1.3 Overarching remarks  
1. Despite a few additional mechanisms, the essence of the BR 
mechanisms of consultation, evidence-gathering and monitoring has 
not changed (Alemanno 2015). The question remains whether the 
BR can function as the legitimacy enhancing tool it aims to be 
(Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017).  
2. The BR 2015 is presented as a politically neutral initiative. Yet, 
concerns have been raised that political preferences will be 
wrapped in the language of ‘evidence-based’ policy-making 
(Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Wegrich 2015). Banking sector 
reforms show that political discretion and interinstitutional bargaining 
are still important features of EU policy-making (Spendzharova 2016). 
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3. The BR seems to operate on the basis of a faulty, unproven 
problem definition. In fact, the problem (if any) with initiatives that 
have met with ‘bad regulation’ accusations instead seems to be that 
they were (presented as) too scientific and were not politically savvy. 
To the extent that some 'too scientific' initiatives have been 
withdrawn in light of the BR 2015,  and that the latter might act as a 
deterrent to initiate new legislation whenever new problems emerge, 
the BR 2015 is applied to the contrary of its own objective to foster 
evidence-based decision-making (Garben 2018). 
1.4 Main observations from the literature review 
1. Develop new, ‘horizontal’ standards for scientific evidence and 
for the provision of scientific advice (Hines 2016; Meads and Allio 
2015). Changes could be included for scrutiny in the inception IA. All 
evidence accrued throughout the IA could be transparently graded 
through an online evidence portal (Hines 2016).  
2. Ensure external peer-review of the evidence base in IA by 
reviewers selected on a case-by-case basis for their expertise on the 
subject (Hines 2016).  
3. Provide support on methodological issues, as well as on 
consistency, quality and robustness of quantification and modelling. 
The JRC has expressed readiness to provide such support (RSB SG 
and JRC Working Group 2018).  
4. Develop a common methodology between the three 
institutions.  In particular, define a methodological guide on 
sustainable development (Van den Abeele 2015). 
5. Guidance on important methodological aspects, though at least 
partially included in the new IA guidelines, would only be possible and 
effective if (Renda 2015): 
(a) the Secretariat General (SG) and the other DGs would agree on 
the approach to policy appraisal (Renda 2015); 
(b) the EC would adopt a set of criteria and indicators that 
match Europe’s vision for the medium and long term 
(Renda 2015). 
6. Make it possible for citizens, organizations or businesses to 
provide some form of counter-evidence about the factual 
information upon which proposed or adopted regulations are based, 
and to have it assessed by an independent body (Voermans 2016). 
7. Develop a consolidated framework to include social validity, 
behavioural insights and legal validity into IA. The authors 
suggest the Homo Oeconomicus Institutionalis approach (Purnhagen 
and Feindt 2015). 
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8. Make the EC’s new mechanism for independent scientific advice 
work, for example by ensuring appropriate funding and 
communication (Lofstedt and Schlag 2017) and use it to address 
related shortcomings in the BR process  (Hines 2016). 
9. Strengthen the capacity of the EC to further promote evidence-
based and risk-informed policy-making (Lofstedt and Schlag 2017): 
(a) hire more in-house expertise to be less dependent on outside 
consultants, to retain a long-term memory of decisions taken 
(Lofstedt and Schlag 2017); 
(b) provide detailed feedback if the EC decides to disregard 
scientific opinion (Lofstedt and Schlag 2017); 
(c) Move towards a more evidence-based use of the 
precautionary principle (Lofstedt and Schlag 2017). 
10. MSs need to be more receptive to science-based policy-making 
(Lofstedt and Schlag 2017). 
11. Make the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) intervene to ensure 
scrutiny by social scientists on public consultations as well as 
policy options in IAs (Hines 2016). 
12. Make decisions only when benefits justify costs and encourage the 
selection of regulatory options that are least restrictive, make 
greatest use of market forces, and promote innovation (Meads and 
Allio 2015). 
13. Highlight the need to ensure a high level of consumer protection, 
which specifically means that IAs should not focus on less protective 
options (van Schagen 2017).  
14. The IAs and the subsidiarity principle tests should always bear in 
mind the cost of non-EU, as a consequence of non-existent EU 
legislative initiatives (Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
15. The EC should take a lesson from the US and increase its standards of 
analysis (Parker and Alemanno 2015). 
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2 Integrated policy cycle22 
2.1 [Achievements] Closing the policy cycle as a 
fundamental step to produce more coherent 
legislation  
2.1.1 Overall achievements (aspects common to both 
evaluation and IA) 
1. The BR 2015 is a step forward towards closing the policy cycle, 
integrating all existing regulatory management standards in a 
seamless, consistent, and coherent approach (Broughel 2015; 
Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Kubera 2017; Meads and Allio 
2015; Radaelli 2018; Renda 2015; Smismans 2015; Stephenson 
2017), also thanks to the fact that the RSB has a formal task in 
judging the quality of evaluations in addition to IAs (van Golen 
and van Voorst 2016) 23.  
2. After receiving criticism from other EU institutions for a lack of 
accountability and transparency in its legislative process, the EC 
launched a number of reforms in which evaluation played a 
key part (van Golen and van Voorst 2016). 
3. The new Guidelines are broader in scope than the previous ones, 
providing standardised guidance throughout the entire policy cycle 
(Chase and Schlosser 2015; EPRS 2015; Nowag and Groussot 2018); 
they encompass all the previous EC policies to improve the policy 
evaluation into a common toolbox (Raccah 2016) and are more user-
friendly in presentation (EPRS 2015); 
(a) The introduction of extensive monitoring- and evaluation-
specific guidance is one of the principal developments, which 
emphasise more strongly evaluation should feed into IA (and vice 
versa) (EPRS 2015). 
4. The use of evaluation has improved. The values of both evaluation 
and IA composite indicators24 are higher than the averages of other 
OECD jurisdictions (OECD 2018).  
5. Emphasis on the timing of analysis is crucial for being able to 
inform the legislative process (Broughel 2015). 
                                           
(22)  The section includes the debate on evaluations and IAs. Throughout the text, consistently 
with the ‘evaluate first’ principle, we decided to present first the messages related to 
evaluation and then those referring to IAs.   
(23)  The analysis of van Golen and van Voorst (2016) combines a dataset of 309 evaluations 
(2000-2014) and a dataset of 225 IAs of legislative updates (2003-2014). See Annex 3 for 
details. 
(24)  The OECD uses three composite indicators to assess regulatory requirements and practices: 
one for IA, one for stakeholder engagement and one for evaluation. Each composite 
indicator is composed of four equally weighted categories: systematic adoption; 
methodology; oversight and quality control; transparency. 
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6. This process has a value in itself since it has generated a greater 
awareness of the costs and of the benefits of regulatory actions 
(Golberg 2018).  
7. The EC announced its intention to mainstream the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in its policy process. BR elements in 
some respects already allow for this (for example, sustainable 
development is included in the BR toolbox as one of the impacts that 
should be considered in an IA ) (Renda 2017a). 
8. The mechanisms set within the Interinstitutional Agreement 
on Better Law-Making (IIA)25 for evaluations and IAs are 
important and cover most of the legislation (De Feo 2017). 
2.1.2 Achievements related to evaluation 
1. The EC has, as a whole, a well-designed system of evaluations 
and fitness checks, which are well-managed and quality controlled 
(ECA 2018; Ruhl 2017)2627.  
2. The EC committed itself to systematic, high-quality evaluation 
(Mastenbroek et al. 2016; Radaelli 2018). 
3. The current agenda extends policy evaluation from financial to 
regulatory instruments (Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Kubera 
2017; Smismans 2015). 
4. The evaluation system combines systematic evaluations of 
individual regulations with comprehensive 'fitness checks' of 
policy sectors (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017; Kubera 2017; OECD 2018). 
5. Evaluation guidelines are a more hierarchical document to be 
followed by all DGs (Smismans 2015; Smismans 2017). The BR 
2015 provides further guidance on certain practices, such as the use 
of 'back-to-back' evaluations and IA (EPRS 2017). 
6. The BR 2015 strengthens the participatory dimension of 
evaluation as for IA, also during the evaluation process (Eliantonio 
and Spendzharova 2017; Kubera 2017; OECD 2018; Smismans 
2017); this is supported by the EU initiative of publishing the forward 
planning of all evaluations (‘evaluation calendar’) (Kubera 2017). 
7. Ex-post reviews are publicly available and accessible (ECA 2018). 
The majority of reports contains useful recommendations and has 
a concise executive summary (ECA 2018; Mastenbroek et al. 2016) 28. 
                                           
(25) European Parliament, Council of the European Union and European Commission (2016). 
(26)  Note that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) audit covers 'ex-post reviews': these 
include evaluations and fitness checks, as well as a wider set of reports outside the scope of 
the BR. Weaknesses are identified notably for reviews other than evaluations (ECA 2018). 
For the sake of clarity, in this report we keep the original terminology used in the ECA 
report (most findings are referred to 'ex-post reviews' in general). Findings specifically 
related only to ex-post reviews other than evaluations are instead not reported. See also 
Annex 3. 
(27)  Ruhl (2017) considers selected aspects of evaluations carried out on the Regulations in the 
field of private international law. These refer mostly to the years before 2015. 
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8. There is a considerable increase in evaluations carried out in 
2017, which also reflects complex exercises (EPRS 2017).  
(a) Evaluation as thus far practiced in private international law is by 
and large on the right track (Ruhl 2017). 
9. Progress is being made in applying the ‘evaluate first’ principle 
(RSB cited by ECA, 2018; Golberg, 2018).  
10. It is to be expected that review of legislation in its different 
forms will benefit from an increasingly prominent role in the 
legislative cycle as such and also for the EP committees (Weber et al. 
2017)29. 
2.1.3 Achievements related to IA 
1. The EC has improved the IA scope of application by including also 
non-legislative initiatives, as well as delegated and implementing 
acts. Interesting is also the introduction of a 'comply or explain'-
principle30 (Stoffel 2015). 
2. The new Guidelines appear to increase the procedural coherence 
of the EC’s IA process (EPRS 2015; Hines 2016).  
(a) The lack of a mandatory standard list in the Guidelines may help 
to avoid a ‘checklist mentality’ (van Schagen 2017). 
(b) Certain additional elements must now always be included in 
the final IA Report, such as impacts on Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) and on competitiveness. Increased attention 
is given to consultation and stakeholders (EPRS 2015). 
(c) Behavioural economics and risk analysis are strengthened 
(EPRS 2015).  
(d) Subsidiarity is singled out more clearly as a self-standing issue; 
the proportionality principle is presented more clearly as a 
comparison criteria (EPRS 2015). 
(e) They contain a strong call, when designing policy options, to 
consider several alternatives (EPRS 2015). 
(f) Operational objectives are now to be presented more clearly 
(EPRS 2015). 
(g) There are now also four compulsory annexes to any IA: 
procedural information; stakeholder consultation; who is affected 
by the initiative and how; analytical models used (EPRS 2015). 
                                                                                                                  
(28) The dataset used by Mastenbroek et al. (2016) refers to the years 2000-2012. See Annex 3 
for details. 
(29)  Weber et al. (2017) analyse review clauses and conducted reviews. The analysis draws on a 
desk-based review referring to the years 2004 to 2015. See Annex 3 for details. 
(30) In the BR Toolbox (European Commission, 2017, p.50), it is stated: ‘[w]henever it is 
concluded that no IA is needed, this must be flagged and explained to the public through 
the roadmap’. 
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(h) The EC is amongst the few jurisdictions worldwide that formally 
provide guidance on how to consider the international 
regulatory environment as part of their IA guidelines (OECD 
2018). 
(i) The new Guidance for assessing the impact of a proposed 
measure on trade is far more detailed and useful than previous 
guidance (Chase and Schlosser 2015). 
3. The quality of IAs has improved over time (EP cited in Golberg, 
2018). 
4. IA does not necessarily determine the nature of the decision of 
whether to regulate or not, but it (may) improve on the quality of 
a decision (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2017). 
5. Despite the omission in the Guidelines of reiterating compliance with 
the Charter31, there are examples of IAs that have considered 
impacts on fundamental rights and consumer protection (van 
Schagen 2017). 
6. The EC urges rightly that the other European institutions should 
take more of an active role when producing IAs (Lofstedt and 
Schlag 2017). IA can be conducted also at the initiative of the EP or 
the Council (Leszczyńska 2018). 
7. A growing number of MS are examining IAs also as a basis for their 
own analysis of implementing EU law (Golberg 2018).  
8. The use of IA as an efficient tool to promote a BR strategy at all 
levels of government has been exploited by local and regional 
authorities (Taulègne 2017). 
9. IAs have the potential to bring more evidence/rationality to 
the core reasoning of the CJEU (Nowag and Groussot 2018).   
10. The presence of Inception IAs allows a simplified analysis already at 
very early stages. A similar reform is sometimes called for in also the 
US (Broughel 2015; Parker and Alemanno 2015). 
                                           
(31)  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
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2.2 [Issues] …but challenges to ensure a cyclical 
understanding of policy-making for all types of policy 
intervention still persist 
2.2.1 Overall issues (aspects common to both evaluation and 
IA) 
1. It remains unclear how much of the rhetoric about a ‘regulatory 
cycle’ holds up in practice (van Golen and van Voorst 2016). 
Information from evaluation and IAs is still not embedded in the 
decision-making process (De Feo 2017; Voermans 2016).  
2. There are misfits between the key objectives of evaluation, 
based on assessing outcome in relation to the objectives set at the 
origin of an initiative, and IA, which is set in relation to wider EU 
objectives (Smismans 2015). 
3. The IA process is better institutionally organized than for 
evaluation. There are also misfits in the way IA and evaluation 
objectives have been institutionalised, for example on (Smismans 
2015): 
(a) the gap between the type of evidence gathered: IAs aim to 
assess future economic, social and environmental impacts, while 
for evaluation evidence may be gathered in function of (financial) 
programme or project assessment that is not necessarily linked 
to the IA system. Furthermore, evaluations with different scope, 
assessing different objectives or indicators of the same initiative 
may be adopted in parallel following different life cycles  
(Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Smismans 2015; van Golen 
and van Voorst 2016); 
(b) different legal requirements on when IA and evaluation need to 
be adopted (Smismans 2015); 
(c) lack of established time frames and absence of a cyclical 
process in relation to regulatory intervention (Smismans 2015); 
(d) different focus on accountability versus learning (Smismans 
2015);  
(e) different expectations about the actors to be involved 
(Smismans 2015);  
(f) imbalance in experience and available evidence regarding IA 
and evaluation in different DGs (Smismans 2015). 
The challenges are so considerable that it may be that efforts focus 
on one particular objective, namely reducing the regulatory 
burden (Renda 2016; Smismans 2015).  
4. There are challenges for the BR 2015 to really embrace the 
SDGs as announced by the EC. What is missing in the Guidelines is 
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notably an adequate methodological framework; a way to measure 
distance from SDG targets; and criteria to prioritise certain impacts 
over others in the case of trade-offs (Renda 2017a). 
5. Political timetables might have an effect on the quality of the 
analytical or consultation exercise, which risks being rushed at the 
beginning and at the end of the five-year EC term (Golberg 2018). 
6. There is an ongoing tension between special reports of the 
European Court of Auditors (ECA) (largely ex post), EC IAs and 
evaluations, and the EP’s own IAs, when it comes to findings that 
influence the policy debate (Stephenson 2017).  
7. The world of comitology32, which accounts for more than 80% of 
EU regulatory output, is not adequately incorporated in a cyclical 
approach (Voermans 2016). 
8. For an integrated regulatory management approach, challenges 
arise with respect to (Radaelli and Schrefler 2015): 
(a) strategic and operational management (Radaelli and 
Schrefler 2015); 
(b) the availability of additional capacity to cope with an 
increased workload (Delogu 2016; Radaelli and Schrefler 2015). 
This might need redirecting resources from IA efforts to the 
REFIT programme (Radaelli and Schrefler 2015). 
2.2.2 Issues related to evaluation 
1. Scope and focus  
(a) It is unclear what kind of study meets the threshold to be 
defined an evaluation (Radaelli 2018). 
(b) Evaluation is challenging because of the difficulty to identify 
the initial objectives of initiatives; these might have a 
changing nature over time. The problems are exacerbated when 
evaluation is aimed towards performance rather than compliance, 
particularly when there is a shift from project and programme 
level to a broader political evaluation (Smismans 2015). 
(c) Deficiencies are found in the scope and focus of the 
evaluations (Ruhl 2017). 
2. The different epistemic communities engaging in evaluation may 
not share the same learning objectives and understanding of 
desirable policy goals and coherence (Eliantonio and Spendzharova 
2017). 
  
                                           
(32)  These are 'implementing rules drawn up by the European Commission - and assisted in this 
task by committees of experts from Member States' (Voermans 2016), p.21). 
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3. Data and methodology  
(a) Deficiencies are found as regards the quality of available data 
(Ruhl 2017). 
(b) Shortcomings exist in the recognition of data limitations (ECA 
2018). 
i. Incompleteness or lack of data, data quality and issues with 
stakeholders consultations can be due to a lack of monitoring 
or reviews being carried out at an inappropriate time. Some 
ex-post reviews recognize those limitations and explain 
how they were addressed (the 2017 update of the toolbox 
contains a recommendation to include an explicit assessment 
of the limits encountered in data collection and modelling) 
(ECA 2018).  
ii. Stakeholders' involvement is unsatisfactory (Mastenbroek 
et al. 2016).  
(c) There is no homogenous treatment of methodology in the 
examined ex-post reviews (ECA 2018). The methodological 
quality is disappointing (Mastenbroek et al. 2016; Radaelli 2018). 
i. The reason for choosing a particular methodology is not 
always provided and its outline is not always comprehensive 
(ECA 2018; Mastenbroek et al. 2016). 
ii. The majority of studies lack replicability (Mastenbroek et al. 
2016). 
iii. The tools for evaluation are far less established and clear-
cut than for IA so bound to raise more political debate 
(Smismans 2017); 
iv. There is lack of clarity on a provision in the BR which refers 
to evaluation exercises aimed at verifying too burdensome 
impacts on 'specific' sectors (Renda 2015); 
v. Evaluation is complicated and costly; measuring benefits is 
more difficult than measuring costs. Therefore, it may be that 
the evaluation system will be used particularly in 
function of reducing the regulatory burden, with a focus 
on measuring short-term costs (Smismans 2015). 
(d) A tendency towards a more consistent presentation of 
conclusions and next steps was found in the examined ex-post 
reviews, but this is not yet standard practice (ECA 2018). 
(e) The quality of the external studies underlying evaluations is 
extremely uneven (Ruhl 2017).  In a few cases in the examined 
ex-post reviews a clear reference to the supporting study was 
not available (ECA 2018). 
(f) Back-to-back evaluations/IAs entail risks for the 
independence of the evaluation, as well as for the added value of 
the evaluation, when it is not completed in time (ECA 2018). 
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4. Monitoring   
(a) Review and monitoring clauses are widely present (ECA 
2018) however they are often limited to a technocratic exercise 
(De Feo, 2017). 
i. A dedicated tool was introduced only in the BR 2015 
revision in 2017. There are no common interinstitutional 
guidelines (the IIA underlines their relevance but is not 
legally binding) (ECA 2018). 
ii. It is not possible to draw a consistent causal link between 
the type of ex-post review and its timing (ECA 2018; 
Weber et al. 2017). 
(b) Frameworks are missing or poor in many cases (RSB cited 
in Golberg, 2018).This is often seen as the least important part of 
an IA/preparatory process (Golberg 2018). 
(c) Monitoring is often hindered by a lack of data. The 
requirement to collect data is often perceived as an 
administrative burden by the MS (Golberg 2018). 
(d) In IAs there is no requirement to include a separate section on 
assessing data from previous evaluations. For expenditure 
policy, data from evaluation do not always systematically feed 
back into the current type of ex-ante financial evaluation. For 
regulatory policy, there is no broad availability of ex-post data 
that could feed into new initiatives (Smismans 2015). 
5.  Timing 
(a) It is difficult to align evaluation with IA  (Radaelli 2018; Van 
den Abeele 2015). 
i. To conduct evaluation, the EC advises to wait until a 
reasonably complete dataset for three years is available. 
This may affect the planning of the evaluation and of ensuing 
legislative revisions (EPRS 2016). 
ii. Given the length of the policy cycle, evaluation cannot 
meaningfully start before a minimum of ten years from 
initial work on a proposal. This period exceeds two EC 
terms. There is a tendency to consider evaluations of past 
performance as having a lower political profile. Even when 
linked to new proposals, the evaluation is often rushed to get 
the IA finalised (Golberg 2018). 
iii. Evaluations carried out too early may not lead to 
conclusive results and need to be complemented at a later 
stage (EPRS 2017). 
iv. Evaluation could come too late to inspire the next 
programme round (Smismans 2015). 
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v. The EC complies poorly with the evaluation deadlines 
(Ruhl 2017). 
(b) The link between some planned studies and the 
subsequent evaluation is not always clear (EPRS 2017). 
(c) Information and justification for delayed evaluations is not 
regularly available (EPRS 2017). 
6. Outsourcing of evaluation 
(a) Evaluation is frequently outsourced (Stephenson 2017), as the 
EC’s staff is too small to perform these studies and external 
evaluations are believed to be more objective (van Golen and van 
Voorst 2016). External parties lack the experience, notably 
on consultations, the EC has built up in relation to IA (Smismans 
2017). Note that OECD (2018) reports that the EC is amongst the 
best equipped institutions worldwide concerning full time analyst 
staff. 
(b) Independence of evaluators is definitely required to ensure 
financial accountability, but may be less appropriate if the aim 
is policy learning (Smismans 2015). 
(c) Policy evaluation may be too heavily perceived as a 
European level game, involving in particular the EC and an 
industry of consultancies which operate mainly as European or 
international businesses (Smismans 2015). 
(d) Not all policy issues lend themselves to the type of 
evaluation commonly conducted by external consultants 
(Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017). 
(e) There is no complete picture of the cost of reviews that have 
so far been carried out by the EC (Weber et al. 2017). 
7. Transparency and access to results are found to be limited 
(Mastenbroek et al. 2016; Ruhl 2017; Weber et al. 2017). 
(a) The EC does not document the results of all its evaluations of 
EU legislation centrally (Mastenbroek et al. 2016; Weber et al. 
2017). 
(b) Moreover, they are not published in a form which would allow 
them to be easily linked with specific review clauses in EU 
legislation (Weber et al. 2017).  
(c) It remains difficult to determine when any given Regulation is 
being evaluated or what the status of an ongoing evaluation is. 
This is mainly attributable to the information on evaluations being 
found in a large number of different, and sometimes quite 
lengthy, documents (Ruhl 2017). There is also the possibility 
that some reviews have not been carried out at all (Weber et al. 
2017). 
8. Use  
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(a) Evaluations are not generating sufficiently convincing 
evidence that results of EU intervention are being delivered in 
the most effective and efficient manner, notably for REFIT 
(Golberg 2018). 
(b) Evaluation coverage is patchy.  Evaluation is primarily a 
matter of legislative obligation instead of own initiative. Process 
evaluation overall seems more important than product evaluation 
(Mastenbroek et al. 2016).  
(c) Analysis shows that use of IAs by evaluations and of 
evaluations by IAs is limited (van Golen and van Voorst 
2016). This is not surprising, given what we know about the use 
of evaluations in other political systems like the USA (Dunlop and 
Radaelli, 2017). 
i. Ex-post reviews are not always used by the EC when 
preparing IAs (ECA 2018). 
ii. Analysis shows that the proportion of IAs making use of 
an available evaluation is much larger than the 
proportion of evaluations making use of an available 
IA. This could be explained by the fact that an IA of a 
legislative amendment is usually conducted right after an 
evaluation of the previous legislation; that IAs are often 
conducted internally, making it easier for the EC to stimulate 
the use of evaluation (van Golen and van Voorst 2016). It 
may be harder for evaluations to use IAs than the other way 
around, as IAs are often conducted before legislation is 
amended by the Council and the EP (van Golen and van 
Voorst 2016; Weber et al. 2017). 
iii. Timeliness is crucial. An evaluation must be published at 
least a year before the IA, otherwise it is very unlikely to be 
used. For the use of IAs by evaluations, the analysis did not 
reveal any causes or combinations of conditions which are 
sufficient or necessary (van Golen and van Voorst 2016). 
(d) Most of the time evaluations remain without follow-up (De Feo 
2017). 
(e) Analysis has shown that evaluations may be used 
instrumentally, even if their recommendations are opposed by 
important political actors in the legislative process. A lack of 
salience of the policy field in the eyes of the EC could, in 
combination with the institution’s ambition to reduce its 
legislative output, be a sufficient condition for the non-use of that 
evaluation. The fact that evaluations often recommend changing 
legislation to improve it contradicts the EC’s plans to propose 
little legislation outside of its priority fields. This contradiction 
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leads to reduced possibilities for evaluation use (Van Voorst 
and Zwaan 2018)33.  
(f) An analysis of to what extent and when Members of the EP use 
evaluations shows that the parliamentary questions hardly serve 
accountability aims. Members of EP mostly use evaluation 
for agenda-setting purposes. The main variable explaining 
differences in the usage of evaluations is the level of conflict 
between the EP and EC during the legislative process (Zwaan et 
al. 2016)3435.  
9. The RSB mandate for evaluations is not as systematic as for 
IAs (for which RSB scrutiny is always required, with a few 
exceptions) (Smismans 2017). 
10. The EC systematically forwards its reports on the ex-post reviews to 
the EP and the Council; the latter however seldom react directly 
(however this does not fully reflect the fact that the co-legislators can 
take into account and use EC reports at a later stage or within a 
different context) (ECA 2018). 
11. The impact of reviews of EU legislation on the work of the EP 
and the EC is limited. There is, however, an increasing share of 
legislative reviews followed up by initiatives in the EC’s annual 
working programmes (Weber et al. 2017). 
 
2.2.3 Issues related to IA 
1. Decision on whether to undertake an IA 
(a) For Inception IA, there is no explicit definition of when it 
should be compiled; systematic deviations from procedures on 
timing are also found (Impact Assessment Institute 2017). 
(b) There is no precise definition of which initiatives are subject to 
IA (Alemanno 2015; Golberg 2018; Renda 2015; Renda 2016; 
Stoffel 2015; Van den Abeele 2015).  The decision is made by the 
responsible DG; this insufficient coordination is a very negative 
factor36 and also affects the decision on whether to wait for the 
evaluation to be concluded (van Golen and van Voorst 2016). This 
                                           
(33) Van Voorst and Zwaan (2018) analyse three evaluations in the years 2008-2012 See Annex 
3 for details. 
(34)  Zwaan et al. (2016) use the same data set as Mastenbroek et al. (2016). See Annex 3 for 
details. 
(35)  An analysis of the EP questions for January 2017–March 2018 shows 39 questions that 
mention evaluations. Seven of these reflect on policies evaluated as underperforming. Five 
questions on on-going evaluations demand that the evaluation be geared towards 
dimensions of policy performance or ask the EC to be more explicit on the evaluation 
strategy. MEPs also question the method of evaluation (17 questions), ask for actions to be 
taken once the evaluation is done (10 questions) or point towards lack of evaluation (17 
questions). Sometimes conclusions from an evaluation are the simply the introduction to 
the question (10 questions) (Radaelli 2018). 
(36) The Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the Commission’s Impact Assessment System. 
Final Report, April 2007, cited in Maśnicki 2016. 
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differs from, for example, the American system which uses 
quantitative thresholds (e.g. regulations having impacts 
greater than a given monetary amount) of the expected impacts 
(Golberg 2018).  
(c) There are cases where IA is not carried out or not done properly 
(Impact Assessment Institute 2017; Radaelli 2018).  
(d) Justification when no IA is carried out is often lacking 
(Impact Assessment Institute 2017; Van den Abeele 2015). 
(e) The need for additional IA by the EP and the Council lacks 
clarity concerning: 
i. what constitutes a ‘substantial’ amendment prompting the 
duty to carry an additional IA  (Alemanno 2015; Radaelli 
2018); the principle  that for substantive amendments the 
Council and EP should conduct their own IA appears not to 
have been applied in practice (the authors here refer to the 
application of the IIA in 2003, and comment the provisions in 
the draft of the new IIA which seems to acknowledge the 
existence of the problem) (van Golen and van Voorst 2016). 
ii. the exact timeline to be followed (Alemanno 2015; Van den 
Abeele 2015); 
iii. a common methodology to be shared by the three 
institutions (Van den Abeele 2015); 
iv. who within the EC might actually provide ‘assistance’ 
(Alemanno 2015); 
v. what could happen if the very same amendment is 
assessed differently by the co-legislators (EP and Council, 
with a role of MSs in the process) and the EC (Alemanno 2015; 
Van den Abeele 2015). 
(f) National exhaustive IAs are still missing. The amount of EU 
legislations that shall be enforced in 28 MSs renders any 
exhaustive study of potential impacts impossible (Raccah 2016). 
2. Methodology  
(a) In the BR 2015 Guidelines, there is no significant innovation 
on procedural modalities and preferred methodologies (Alemanno 
2015); 
(b) The EC doesn’t explain whether the methodology that will be 
used for delegated acts is the same contained in the (new) 
guidelines: one would expect cost-benefit analysis to be applied 
more systematically (Renda 2015).  
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(c) There are persistent weaknesses (Golberg 2018). 
i. Empirical evidence is found to be presented in a selective 
manner (Leszczyńska 2018) 37 (She analyses one IA carried 
out in 2012. She notes that the improvements of the BR 2015 
might help avoiding these shortcomings, but that it is still too 
early to conclude that it is the case). 
ii. There is a tendency to prepare a justification for a 
predetermined preferred option (Delogu, 2016; RSB cited 
in Golberg 2018)38. 
iii. Insufficient explanation of the problem and the necessity 
for an EU-level solution (RSB cited in Golberg, 2018); 
iv. Focus on actions (what the EC wants to do) rather than on 
the results to be achieved (Golberg 2018); 
v. Despite an improvement on the quantification of both costs 
and benefits (RSB cited in Golberg, 2018), there are 
concerns on: 
1. lack of specific data or evidence (Council cited in 
Golberg, 2018);  
2. outdated data (Council cited in Golberg, 2018); 
3. performance indicators, methodologies, modelling, 
scenarios, criteria, and a narrow scope of analysis of 
the data (Council cited in Golberg, 2018); 
4. inconsistent links between calculations and policy 
choices (Council cited in Golberg, 2018); 
5. insufficient coverage of certain impacts (Council cited 
in Golberg 2018). The Guidelines have been criticised for 
their lack of priority given to health, safety and 
environmental concerns (van Schagen 2017): 
a. The Guidelines do not reflect the need to prioritise 
consumer protection even though it is contrary to the 
Charter, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), and CJEU case law (van Schagen 2017).  
b. The Toolbox refers to consumer protection but it does 
not consider consumers’ legal position and assumes 
the beneficial effects of the free market. There is a 
tendency towards consumer confidence and 
empowerment rather than protection (van Schagen 
2017).   
6. better enforcement is rarely considered separately (van 
Schagen 2017);   
                                           
(37) Leszczyńska (2017) deals with the IA issued in 2012 by the EC with a Directive proposing a 
40% obligatory female representation on the boards of directors in European public 
companies. 
(38) Delogu (2016) reports the claims of business organizations.  
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7. Insufficient understanding of national 
circumstances and impacts (RSB, Council cited in 
Golberg, 2018); 
(d) Analysis shows that all six mainstreamed objectives39 defined 
in the EU treaties have a place within the IA system, but their 
systematic consideration is not ensured (Smismans and Minto 
2017)40.  
3. Use 
(a) IAs can be difficult to rely on in practice. This is due to their 
complexity, cost and methodology. The useful IA is difficult to 
realise (Nowag and Groussot, 2018). 
(b) It is unclear if and how IAs really genuinely inform the 
development of the proposals (Radaelli 2018; Van den Abeele 
2015), also because they are published simultaneously (Radaelli 
2018). 
(c) If we assume that politicians and bureaucrats are smart, we 
should also assume that gaming of BR procedures is 
happening. For IAs, this could mean that the evidence that 
supports the initially preferred option has received a more 
prominent treatment than the others (Wegrich 2015). IAs may 
become a source of abuse and inefficiency when used as a 
political control tool or in an inappropriate way (Delogu 2016). 
(d) The IA has only post-decision effect, since the decision on 
whether to initiate legislation is made already within the 
Inception IA (Dunlop and Radaelli 2015; Maśnicki 2016). 
(e) The fact that more IAs should be conducted at different stages 
raises a number of questions (Van den Abeele 2015): 
i. targeted IAs might unbalance the entire proposal (Van 
den Abeele 2015); 
ii. the obligation for 'significant amendments' to be 
systematically justified by a neutral IA risks compromising 
the fluidity of the process (Van den Abeele 2015); 
iii. an IA conducted after the trialogue risks delegitimising 
the ordinary legislative procedure (Van den Abeele 2015). 
(f) IAs are not binding on either the EP or the Council (Golberg 
2018). The Council amendments to legislative proposals are not 
subject to any assessment (Renda 2016).  
                                           
(39) A political objective is said to be 'mainstreamed' when it becomes horizontally applicable 
across all policy areas (in the analysis, these are: gender equality; the horizontal social 
clause; non-discrimination on the basis of gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation; environmental policy integration for sustainable 
development; consumer protection; securing fundamental rights. Smismans and Minto, 
2017). 
(40) The analysis in Smismans and Minto (2017) considers 35 IAs adopted between 6 May 2011 
and 20 February 2014. See Annex 3 for details. 
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(g) The BR is considered soft law41 without clear legal effects. It is 
highly unlikely that a direct challenge of a particular IA would be 
successful (Leszczyńska 2018). 
(h) None of the external IAs reviewers (RSB, the European 
Ombudsman, the ECA and the CJEU) takes a comprehensive view 
(Meuwese 2017). 
i. The review undertaken by ECA and European Ombudsman 
remains limited in scope. There is an incremental increase of 
activities by the CJEU (Meuwese 2017). 
ii. The move from Impact Assessment Board (IAB) to the 
RSB implies that more attention for substantive review may 
be expected. Yet the ‘procedural approach’ remains an 
attractive option. The RSB only provides a non-specialist 
peer-review (Hines 2016). 
iii. The RSB is attempting to contribute to an informational level-
playing field. One risk related to this type of review is that its 
role becomes so routinised that the EC start relying on the 
RSB as an additional source of expertise, rather than trying to 
meet its standards as a reviewer (Meuwese 2017).  
4. IA of implementing regulations (Voermans 2016): 
(a) Exemption to the need for an IA can readily be claimed since the 
basic regulation itself will most of the time have been subjected 
to an IA (Voermans 2016); 
(b) not technically possible from a cost and capacity perspective 
(Voermans 2016).  
2.3 Overarching remarks  
1. The BR philosophy is today the dominant ‘doctrine’ in the EC 
thinking about what IA and evaluation should be and for what 
purposes (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2017). 
2. At the moment, the actors as well as the problems and methods 
of the different types of IAs and evaluations (including REFIT) are 
not the same (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2017). 
3. The changes introduce by BR 2015 will bring about a degree of 
politicisation42 in evaluation (Smismans 2017), favored by: 
                                           
(41) Soft law instruments are acts with no legally binding force, but which may be characterized 
by normative content. Official EU soft law, as recognised by the TFEU, consists of 
recommendations and opinions. Other forms of soft law are, for example: annual reports, 
legislative agendas, white books, green books, guidelines, notices, and communications, 
codes of conduct, declarations, resolutions and inter-institutional agreements. 
(42)  The term politicisation is used here as a ‘neutral’ concept, referring to a process in which 
the topic becomes increasingly part of a debate and agenda that is set, influenced by and 
played out in the political realm and not simply by experts and administrators (Smismans 
2017). 
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(a) evaluation becoming a political priority (linked to the one of 
reducing the regulatory burden), despite being presented as a 
neutral exercise. Interest groups and citizens are encouraged 
to contribute, but are not supposed to put into question the 
objectives of the process itself. Evaluation also becomes a tool of 
centralization within the new EC (Smismans 2017);  
(b) its more systematic planning and scrutiny (Smismans 2017);  
(c) the focus on linking evaluation and IA (Smismans 2017); 
(d) the application of evaluation to regulatory intervention as 
well as to expenditure policy (Smismans 2017); 
(e) increased attention for the interinstitutional dimension 
(Smismans 2017; Stephenson 2017); 
(f) increasing participatory dimension of evaluation (Smismans 
2017). 
4. The mainstreamed objectives are overshadowed in the IA system 
by concerns about economic impact and regulatory burden, although 
these have not been constitutionalized in the treaties as horizontal 
objectives (Smismans and Minto 2017). 
5. By increasingly stressing the need to reduce ‘regulatory 
burden’, the EU risks strengthening a populist discourse that is not 
evidence based. At the same time, evaluation is a key tool of 
evidence-based policy-making to falsify the claims of populist 
discourse (Smismans 2017). 
6. So far, the CJEU has not subjected the IA to any further 
requirements, so that one might even argue that an IA provides 
immunity to a measure (Nowag and Groussot 2018) (see also 
section 4.3). 
7. Overstating the potential of IA to determine decisions creates 
excessive expectations and inevitable frustration. And the political 
decision-makers would be more willing to invest on consideration of 
technical assessments if it were clear that the role of experts in the 
decision-making process is to better inform, not to constrain the 
political process (Delogu 2016).  
8. IA has a strategic role (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017): 
(a) for MSs and pressure groups, for possible control on the policy 
formulation activity of the EC (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017); 
(b) for the EC, for strategic and operational management (Dunlop 
and Radaelli 2017). 
 36 
2.4 Main observations from the literature review  
2.4.1 General observations (aspects common to both 
evaluation and IA) 
1. Keep IA and evaluation documents accessible, understandable 
and useful for decision-makers (Golberg 2018). 
2. Enforce the ‘evaluate first’ principle (ECA 2018; van Golen and 
van Voorst 2016). The EC should not validate a proposal the IA of 
which is not based on previous evaluation; the RSB should pay due 
attention to its effective use (ECA 2018). 
3. Focus on supporting policy-making, rather than on meeting 
procedural requirements (Golberg 2018). 
4. The BR 2015 should become an instrument for policy coherence 
with long-term goals and with global strategies. This would also 
help to acquire more EP and Council’s ownership of IA (Renda 2016; 
Taulègne 2017). 
5. Mainstream SDGs in the EU policy process. This would require 
changes in definition of the problem and objectives in EU IA; to 
improve scientific input; to adjust the methodology to compare 
alternative policy options; the choose adequately monitoring and 
evaluation indicators; to involve other EU institutions; to plan regular 
reporting (Renda 2017a).  
6. All Institutions should acquire ownership of the procedure. 
Structure the scrutiny exercise by including a procedure for the 
oversight of legislation based on performance (De Feo 2017) (the 
author makes a concrete suggestion in this respect). 
7. Formalise the EU pre-legislative procedure (Raccah 2016). 
8. To achieve the objective of an encompassing cyclical approach 
(Smismans 2015): 
(a) evaluation and IA units should not operate in isolation and 
should reach those responsible for drafting policy (Smismans 
2015); 
(b) a more participatory approach to evaluation would provide 
valuable information but also create a continuum in the 
broader set of actors involved. However, this raises a wider 
question about who is expected to organise such broader 
participation (Smismans 2015); 
(c) the more political nature of the type of cyclical policy level 
learning suggests envisaging a more important role for the EP 
(Smismans 2015); 
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(d) policy coherence might be improved if IA relied on more ex-
post data assessing policy outcomes in relation to broader EU 
policy (Smismans 2015). 
2.4.2 Observations related to evaluations 
1. Enhance the coverage of evaluations (Mastenbroek et al. 2016). 
2. Conduct a gap analysis of data collection and management 
capabilities (ECA, 2018). 
3. Establish a systematic and ongoing obligation of the MSs to 
collect data (Ruhl 2017). 
4. Improve the methodological quality (ECA 2018; Mastenbroek et al. 
2016). The EC should grant the RSB the right to scrutinize ex-post 
reviews other than evaluations (ECA 2018); stakeholders 
(Mastenbroek et al. 2016) and experts should be involved, the latter 
by creating a permanent expert panel (Ruhl 2017). 
5. Require external evaluators to state whether they used the 
corresponding IA in their analysis and why (van Golen and van 
Voorst 2016). 
6. More efforts appear to be necessary to make best use of the review 
clauses (Weber et al. 2017). 
(a) Clearly define the scope and the data collection (EPRS 2017).  
(b) Costs and benefits should be key elements of monitoring and 
evaluation frameworks (Golberg 2018). 
(c) Ensure a coherent approach between the EC and both co-
legislators (Weber et al. 2017). Develop a vademecum within the 
IIA. The EC should propose to enhance its binding nature (ECA 
2018). 
(d) Streamline the terminology used in legislative acts (Weber et al. 
2017). 
7. Increase transparency with a centralised search engine or 
'evaluation monitor' (Mastenbroek et al. 2016; Ruhl 2017). 
8. Ensure adequate levels of staff expertise (Eliantonio and 
Spendzharova 2017; Stephenson 2017). This would ensure adequate 
learning (Lofstedt and Schlag 2017). 
9. Spend more funds on evaluations and on setting up an evaluation 
culture (Lofstedt and Schlag 2017).  
10. For significant changes or delays, insert a message in the 
roadmap (EPRS 2017). 
11. Move evaluation from one-off complex exercises to ongoing 
assessment (Golberg 2018). 
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12. Include a societal dimension linked to citizen perceptions of the 
impact, consequences and added value of European legislation 
(Taulègne 2017). 
13. The BR itself could benefit from a broad sectorial, and above all, 
independent evaluation of the implementing acts (Voermans 
2016). 
2.4.3 Observations related to IA 
1. Conduct IA by default for every proposal; if not possible, provide a 
clear justification (Impact Assessment Institute 2017). 
2. Clarify the benchmark criterion of 'significant impacts' (Stoffel 
2015) 
3. Ensure the starting point is a neutral one (Impact Assessment 
Institute 2017). 
4. Analyse all relevant options and always include the one that is 
presented in the corresponding legislative proposal (Impact 
Assessment Institute 2017). 
5. The Guidelines should make clearer that in the drafting of proposed 
measures, their impact on fundamental rights and principles, 
including consumer protection, must be assessed (van Schagen 
2017).  
6. IAs should actively explore policy options that are likely to 
maintain or raise the level of consumer protection (van Schagen 
2017) and should consider complaints of non-compliance with 
consumer rights (GfK Belgium quoted in van Schagen, 2017). 
7. Systematise national IAs of EU policy in each legal system (Raccah 
2016).  
8. On the methodology:  
(a) be more transparent about the assumptions and methodologies 
(RegWatchEurope43 cited in Golberg, 2018; Impact Assessment 
Institute 2017); 
(b) more clearly differentiate between direct and indirect 
costs (RegWatchEurope cited in Golberg, 2018); 
(c) separate recurring costs from one-off costs 
(RegWatchEurope cited in Golberg, 2018); 
(d) ensure that assessment methods to identify the costs and 
benefits of a regulation are more objective (e.g. the standard 
cost model developed in the Netherlands) and jointly developed 
                                           
(43)  RegWatchEurope is the banner under which Europe’s seven independent national advisory 
boards coordinate to address and maximise the benefits of Europe’s ‘smart regulation’ 
agenda and reduce regulatory burdens. 
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with citizens, organizations or businesses (see the US) 
(Voermans 2016); 
(e) further develop and ensure a balanced implementation of 
methods that correctly assess costs and both monetary 
and non-monetary benefits (Delogu 2016); 
(f) structure the multi-criteria assessment and appraisal of 
risks. The assessment of risk-related regulation must take into 
account results of the risk assessment made by EU specialized 
bodies (Delogu 2016); 
(g) grant more attention to competitiveness impacts 
(RegWatchEurope cited in Golberg, 2018); 
(h) improve quantification and analysis of effects at MS level 
(RegWatchEurope cited in Golberg, 2018); 
(i) introduce the analysis of legal risks44 in the IA (Raccah 2016);  
(j) the guidance and the toolbox should be more explicit about data 
and methodology to be used for the impact on trade (Chase and 
Schlosser 2015). 
9. IAs should alert officials to the need of particularly justifying the 
choices that diverge from mandatory provisions (van Schagen 
2017). 
10. Use simpler, more streamlined methods for delegated and 
implementing acts (Golberg 2018). 
11. Improve the mainstreaming potential of IAs, for example by 
clarifying the IA guidelines and by adopting a more participatory 
approach (Smismans and Minto 2017). 
12. There should be clarity and honesty about the limitations of IA 
(Delogu 2016). 
 
                                           
(44) The definition of legal risk formulated by the author is the following: the prejudicial 
occurrence arising from an unclear, imprecise or uncertain normative provision imposing 
obligations to an individual, a company or an authority, which would be inequitable or 
financially unreliable (p.20). 
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3 Stakeholder consultation, participation and 
involvement 
3.1 [Achievements] A positive pledge from the 
Commission to listen more closely to stakeholders…  
1. The BR 2015 strengthens public consultation and stakeholder 
involvement commitments (Cărăuşan 2016; Garben 2018; Golberg 
2018; Lofstedt and Schlag 2017). This systematic open approach is 
welcome, in view of more transparency and thus improved 
confidence in legislation (Alemanno 2015; Impact Assessment 
Institute 2017; Renda 2015). 
2. Consultation45 is extended to more types of EU legislation46 
and to every stage of the policy cycle (Chase and Schlosser 2015; 
Delogu 2016; Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Parker and 
Alemanno 2015; Radaelli 2018; Stoffel 2015). Consultations on 
Inception IA represent an opportunity also for MSs to receive more 
information (Sarpi 2015). 
3. The decision to open draft non-legislative acts47 for consultation 
is a long-awaited major change. It addresses not only a growing 
internal demand, but also expectations expressed by the US within 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations (Alemanno 2015; Parker and Alemanno 2015). 
4. Participatory democracy is therefore used to anchor both the 
legitimacy and the effectiveness of proposals (Dawson 2016; 
Meads and Allio 2015) – to identify obstacles to effective 
implementation in advance, and to avoid technocratic rule-making 
(Dawson 2016). The BR 2015 also uses participatory democracy to 
anchor its REFIT programme48 (Dawson 2016; Radaelli 2018). 
5. The consultation process provides the opportunity for new 
information to be gathered by the EC (Eliantonio and Spendzharova 
2017; Impact Assessment Institute 2017; Radaelli 2018). Policy 
actors and analysts are provided with unprecedented systematic 
insight into the stakeholders positions (Eliantonio and Spendzharova 
2017). There are no significant differences between insiders and 
outsiders when evaluating the regime (Bunea 2017).49 
6. Compared to the situation assessed in 2014, there is an 
improvement of stakeholder engagement. The value of the related 
                                           
(45)  Consultation here includes also the possibility to give feedback (as in the case of roadmaps, 
draft delegated and implementing acts, and adopted legislative or policy proposals). 
(46)  Including, notably, non-legislative acts (delegated and implementing acts) and other 
initiatives subject to IAs. 
(47)  i.e. delegated and implementing acts. 
(48)  REFIT is discussed in section 4 of the present document. 
(49)  Bunea (2017) examines stakeholders’ preferences expressed in two consultations in 2012 
and 2014. See Annex 3 for details. 
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composite indicator is the highest among OECD countries (and 
thus also among the single MSs of the EU) (OECD 2018). 
7. The timing for public and stakeholder consultation allows to 
take into account the feedback and information received (Delogu 
2016). 
3.2 [Issues] … but there are concrete challenges to 
translate consultation results into more streamlined 
and coherent policy proposals 
1. Participation of stakeholders 
(a) Self-selection bias (Impact Assessment Institute 2017). 
(b) Limited participation.  
i. Consultations seem to be targeting individuals and groups 
with expertise and technical knowledge (Alemanno 2015).  
ii. Those participating are often those already having access 
to the political process, rather than those who are mostly 
affected by a certain policy initiative (Alemanno 2015; 
Dawson 2016; Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Garben 
2018; Pachl 2015; Sarpi 2015).  
iii. Difficulty to adequately communicate and attract stakeholders 
(Ranchordas 2017). 
iv. The participation of MSs, stakeholders, academics, citizens 
and other parties in evaluation, as is stressed in the BR 
guidelines, is missing concrete mechanisms (Smismans 
2015); two online consultations do not automatically ensure 
that all  relevant parties have an opportunity to express their 
opinion (Smismans 2017). 
v. Limited involvement of stakeholders in consultations 
on evaluations is in line with what we know from other 
jurisdictions where the vast majority of notice and comments 
generate little public input, whilst few consultations attract a 
disproportionate attention because they are politicised by 
pressure groups’ campaigns (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2017). 
(c) Unclear representation of stakeholders’ interests 
(organisations of differing size, representation and economic 
weight; ‘stakeholders campaigns’; role for European Social 
Partners in the area of social policy) (Garben 2018; Impact 
Assessment Institute 2017; Van den Abeele 2015).  
(d) Varying level of expertise of respondents (Impact Assessment 
Institute 2017; Van den Abeele 2015). 
(e) Ambiguous role of  the 'high-level experts' of the REFIT 
Platform (Van den Abeele 2015). 
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2. Workload and consistency of procedures   
(a) Duplication in the consultation procedures 
(roadmaps/Inception IAs and adopted proposals) (Impact 
Assessment Institute 2017). 
(b) The period allowed for replying to consultations has been 
considered too short for preparing positions on complex 
issues (Delogu 2016); this is true also for implementing 
measures and delegated acts, and certain agencies may be 
exempt from the requirement (Chase and Schlosser 2015). 
(c) Too many consultations running in parallel (Garben 2018). 
(d) Significant workload on stakeholders and on the EC itself 
(Impact Assessment Institute 2017; Radaelli and Schrefler 
2015; Renda 2015; Renda 2016; Stoffel 2015). 
(e) Non-Governamental Organisations (NGOs) have lamented 
not to have sufficient resources to compete with business in a 
technical and scientific debate (Delogu 2016). 
(f) Significant work for delegated and implementing acts, and 
difficulties given their technical character (Renda 2015). 
(g) Lack of corresponding proceduralisation, as suggested by 
Article 11 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). This 
prevents a real engagement of public participation (Alemanno 
2018). 
3. Design of the questionnaires  
(a) Significant room to remove key aspects from the consultation, 
since participants are asked to comment on a defined set of 
questions which could preclude certain outcomes (Dawson 
2016; Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Garben 2018). 
(b) Heavy reliance on closed questions and limited room for free 
input. In certain cases, the questions are 'leading' (Impact 
Assessment Institute 2017). 
(c) Limited added value of the responses; the positions are 
usually along pre-determined political lines of which the EC is 
well aware (Garben 2018). 
(d) Complex and technical character (Ranchordas 2017).  
(e) Lack of differentiation between the consultation that would be 
run before, during or immediately after completion of the IA 
(Renda 2015). 
4. Evaluation of results  
(a) Heavy reliance on statistical analysis, which might not offer an 
adequate representation of results (Impact Assessment Institute 
2017). 
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(b) No or purely qualitative evaluation of consultation outputs 
mentioned in the legislative proposal or IA (Impact Assessment 
Institute 2017). 
(c) Where conclusions are reached based on the statistical results of 
consultations (i.e., use of percentages of opinions), it is not 
always clearly stated that they are based on the analysis of 
opinions, rather than evidence (Impact Assessment Institute 
2017). 
5. Availability and use  
(a) Insufficient access to documentation related to consultations 
(Impact Assessment Institute 2017). 
(b) Lack of clear commitments on how to use the results of the 
consultations for policy-making (Chase and Schlosser 2015; 
Dawson 2016; Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Garben 
2018; Impact Assessment Institute 2017; Ranchordas 2017) 
notably in the case of adopted proposals (Alemanno, 2015), 
which carries the risk of reducing consultation to a ritual activity 
only (Dawson 2016; Maśnicki 2016).  
(c) Difficulty of verifying how the consultation process has affected 
policy making: it is not easy to find a direct reflection of the 
stakeholders’ input in the further legislative proposals (Maśnicki 
2016). Some cases show a lack of consideration of stakeholders' 
inputs (Bartlett 2018). On the other hand, excessive expertise 
and consultations might interfere with the political mission of the 
legislators (Willermain and Cioriciu 2015).  
(d) Unclear how divergent information and opposing views are 
contemplated in the regulatory process (Ranchordas 2017). 
(e) In its 2017 Report, the RSB noted improvements but also 
identified quality issues in the use of consultations (RSB cited 
in Golberg, 2018). The Ombudsman found maladministration in 
relation to shortening or not conducting public consultation 
(Ombudsman cited in Golberg, 2018). 
(f) Contradiction in some of the stakeholders’ requests, between 
wanting to comment on a draft proposal (that is, before the 
decision is taken) and at the same time wanting to influence the 
policy choices at an early stage (Delogu 2016; Golberg 2018).  
6. Little is done to tackle other problematic features of the current 
legislative process, such as the frequent use of trialogues, informal 
interinstitutional negotiations taking place behind closed doors 
(Garben 2018). 
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3.3 Overarching remarks  
1. Tensions arise:  
(a) between the ambition for inclusive stakeholder participation 
and its goal of processing stakeholders’ feedback in a systematic, 
scientific manner consistent with the exigencies of evidence-
based policy-making (Bunea 2017); 
(b) between the idea of BR as a vehicle for more participatory 
decision-making and as a guarantee for evidence-based 
governance. What if the public consultation clearly shows a 
majority preference for a policy option that is not based on any 
sound facts? What guarantees legitimacy? (Garben 2018; Radaelli 
2018). 
(c) between an emphasized idea of bottom-up policy-making and 
political and hierarchical control over decision-making, which is 
reflected both in the internal re-enforced central authority within 
the EC and, externally, in the IIA in which a key objective is the 
policy agenda agreed by the principal institutions (Dawson 2016).   
2. The consultation process brings up considerations about 
preserving the institutional balance at the EU level among the 
EC, EP, Council, national parliaments (NPs) and other advisory bodies 
(Alemanno 2015; Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Van den Abeele 
2015). Furthermore, the rather hostile BR stance on ‘gold-plating’ in 
the form of national rules that ‘go beyond’ the standards set in EU 
rules goes against any idea that the BR would foster democracy by 
empowering the national legislator (Garben 2018).  
3. The introduced additional consultation occasions raise legal as well 
as practical challenges, also related to institutional balance issues 
(Alemanno 2015). 
4. The EC is in a way delegating its work to stakeholders who have 
many, varied and conflicting interests. Their influence can open the 
door to hidden influences (Van den Abeele 2015). 
5. The techno-political approach to policy-making of the BR 2015 might 
paradoxically have led to a compression of participatory 
democracy  and somehow chilled stakeholder engagement 
(Alemanno 2018). 
6. Conflict over the BR is rooted in what stakeholders prefer as a 
regulatory system of governance. Evidence shows that 
stakeholders express different preferences: national authorities 
responsible for coordinating the BR and cross-sectoral business 
organizations support deregulatory and technocratic reforms. 
Business and public interest organizations are equally supportive of 
strengthening participatory policy-making. This complexity makes it 
difficult to evaluate the level of success in the implementation of BR 
reforms. Moreover, it raises questions about the methodology used by 
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policy-makers to systematically and accurately process and integrate 
stakeholders’ policy input and feedback into policy-making (Bunea 
and Ibenskas 2017)50. 
3.4 Main observations from the literature review 
1. Step up the efforts to ensure balanced stakeholder input (Pachl 
2015). 
2. Comments and feedback from stakeholders should be actively sought 
earlier in the process (Chase and Schlosser 2015; Delogu 2016). 
3. Provide additional guidance about methodologies for evaluating 
the comments received (Chase and Schlosser 2015). 
(a) Design consultations as effectively as possible, to generate 
evidence by summarizing the consultation results qualitatively and 
quantitatively (Impact Assessment Institute 2017). 
(b) Favour open-ended questions and additional room for 
comments (Ranchordas 2017). 
(c) Issues to be explored should be formulated in a way that takes 
into account all the relevant concerns (Delogu 2016). 
(d) State clearly when conclusions are based on the analysis of 
opinion, rather than evidence (Impact Assessment Institute 
2017). 
4. Develop a method for interactive public exchange throughout the 
legislative process  (Impact Assessment Institute 2017): 
(a) online public expert forum (Impact Assessment Institute 2017); 
(b) early publication of IAs in advance of their review by the RSB 
(Impact Assessment Institute 2017). 
5. Adopt a set of requirements for a more proceduralised approach to 
consultation practices (Parker and Alemanno 2015). 
6. Include citizen narratives as they can provide first-hand and diverse 
perspectives (Ranchordas 2017). 
7. Clarify and uplift the concretisation of the European Citizens’ 
Initiative's modus operandi (Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
8. Alternative types of action to strengthen legitimacy should be 
explored, such as enforcing transparency for 'trialogues' (Garben 
2018; Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
                                           
(50) Bunea and Ibenskas (2017) analysis refers to the ‘Stakeholders Consultation on Smart 
Regulation in the EU’ organized by the European executive in 2012. See Annex 3 for details. 
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4 Level of regulation, including REFIT 
4.1 [Achievements] An attempt to improve and 
streamline EU legislation… 
1. The BR 2015 gives a prominent role to improve EU legislation. As a 
result, there is a decrease in the number of legislative proposals 
and adopted acts, and more streamlined Annual Work Programs of 
the EC (Alemanno 2018; Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Golberg 
2018).  
2. The expected reduction of legislative activity presents an 
opportunity to concentrate more deeply on what has already 
been achieved and to develop its full potential (Pachl 2015). 
Institutions can devote more time to oversight of the legislation (De 
Feo 2017). 
3. While introducing reinforced criteria and procedures for the 
quality of regulation, the EC has dispelled any concern on alleged 
'de-regulatory' orientations (Delogu 2016).  
(a) The active reaction to the first initiatives of the new EC by 
civil society organisations might have positively affected the 
definition of the BR Agenda (Renda 2015). 
(b) Deregulation is a 'myth' of the BR Guidelines. The tools 
discussed are developed to give the answer to the question: 
'how to legislate?', not to the question: 'to legislate, or not to 
legislate?'(Maśnicki 2016). Debates reducing the BR to the issue 
of deregulation are simplistic (Bunea and Ibenskas 2017).  
(c) The BR may very well lead to more regulation, if this is 
warranted by the outcome of evaluation exercises and coincides 
with political priorities (Garben and Govaere 2018).  
4. The package has the potential to improve the multilevel 
governance of the EU, by ensuring involvement of MS which is 
needed in order to oversee transposition measures, as well as to 
reach end-users and to gather information on the impacts of EU 
regulation on the ground (Golberg 2018; Renda 2015; Sarpi 2015). 
5. The REFIT programme: 
(a) allows to extend the scope of evaluation to whole policy 
areas (Delogu 2016); 
(b) can identify overlaps and inconsistencies that have arisen 
over time, together with the negative effect of the practice of 
so-called ‘gold-plating’ (Taulègne 2017); 
(c) deserves appreciation because of its clear mission, realism, 
and comprehensiveness (Voermans 2016); 
(d) has a permanent character (Delogu 2016); 
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(e) is much more political than the evaluation of projects within 
the structural funds (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017); 
(f) business stakeholders become co-responsible for the 
initiatives carried out by the program (Dunlop and Radaelli 
2017); 
(g) although REFIT is a channel for de-regulatory demands, it is 
not framed as anti-EU or anti-regulation per se (Dunlop and 
Radaelli 2017). 
6. The REFIT Platform:  
(a) is an explicit institutionalization of participation and an 
instrument of advocacy for stakeholders (Renda 2015; 
Smismans 2017);  
(b) in terms of good governance, refers to the accountability and 
coherence principles (Maśnicki 2016); 
(c) makes it possible for the public to intervene on technocratic 
aspects (Alemanno 2015; Maśnicki 2016); 
(d) has a concrete role to identify suggestions and proposals 
(Sarpi 2015); 
(e) allows a continuous exchange not only on administrative 
burdens but also on the impact of EU laws (Sarpi 2015); 
(f) puts together national experts and stakeholders (Sarpi 
2015); 
(g) is a connection between the BR and the approach to 
subsidiarity (Radaelli 2018).  
7. The portal 'Lighten the load – have your say'51 shows how the BR 
has also become a major communication and signalling tool (Dunlop 
and Radaelli, 2017). Though it seems more addressed at companies 
wishing to signal burdensome pieces of legislation, there is no 
restriction on the possibility that citizens voice their concerns 
(Renda 2017b). 
8. 'Innovation deal' 52 will address regulatory uncertainties which can 
hinder innovation (Renda 2017b).  
4.2 [Issues] … but criticalities remain 
1. The rhetoric of the EC is focused much more on burdens and 
regulatory costs than benefits (Golberg 2018; Pachl 2015; Renda 
2015; Van den Abeele 2015). The real issue is whether the legislation 
                                           
(51) The platform is available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/lighten-load_en 
(52)  'Innovation deal' is a new instrument launched by EC in 2016 that aims at creating a fast-
track channel for 'quick fixes' in EU and national legislation, through clarification and 
interpretation of legislation, rather than through changes in the text of the law. It will in 
principle address regulatory uncertainties identified by innovators, which can hinder 
innovation within the existing legal framework (Renda 2017b). 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/innovrefit_staff_working_document.pdf  
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in question ultimately brings benefits that outweigh the costs they 
generate, not only in economic but also in broader (e.g. social and 
environmental) terms (Pachl 2015; Van den Abeele 2015). 
2. The focus on streamlining assumes that rational policy design is 
feasible. However, this is not the case when multiple actors are 
involved. Overlap and redundancy can however create more resilience 
if a particular solution fails (Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017). 
3. On the REFIT programme 
(a) The rationale is unclear, as are the criteria by which initiatives 
have been labelled as REFIT (ECA 2018). 
(b) It is inward looking: procedural and interinstitutional. It 
takes insufficient account of the different perspectives and 
contexts of complaints about regulations (Voermans 2016). 
(c) Targets and regulatory budgeting are not suited to EU-level 
governance (Golberg 2018). 
i. If the methodology is based on numbers of laws and not 
costs, insignificant regulations would have the same weight 
as significant ones (Golberg 2018). 
ii. Any request to safeguard cost reductions are seen as 
restricting the co-legislator’s prerogatives (Golberg 
2018). 
iii. Regulatory budgeting risks being a paper exercise (Golberg 
2018). 
(d) Methodological foundations are shaky (Radaelli 2018). 
i. REFIT can be a political springboard for a variety of actions 
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2017; Radaelli 2018). 
ii. The choice of the Directives which have been assessed is 
far from neutral and transparent (Laulom 2018) 53. 
iii. There is a conceptual ambiguity: REFIT is not a proper 
evaluation tool since some REFIT exercises are just 
appraisals of some regulatory costs. Since 2013, ‘cumulative 
cost assessment’ has also been under REFIT. This is not an 
evaluation (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017; Radaelli 2018). 2016 
EC REFIT initiatives only focus on some cost categories 
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2017).  
iv. The methods can be questioned for lack of a transparent 
methodology for the use of stakeholders’ opinions, and the 
difficulty to isolate the effects of the evaluated Directives 
in the national context (Laulom 2018). 
(e) The exclusion of flexibility or gold plating risks negatively 
impacting consumers and citizens and is also counterproductive 
for improving the public perception of the EU (Laulom 2018; 
Pachl 2015). 
                                           
(53) Laulom (2018) analyses the three areas in the social field within the first REFIT Programme 
(results were summarized in a Staff Working Document (SWD) adopted in 2013). 
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(f) Communication to external stakeholders is poor (ECA 2018). 
(g) The results need to be assessed (Golberg 2018).  
i. There has been a limited withdrawal of proposals or pieces 
of legislation54.  
ii. In the 2017 Eurobarometer survey, few businesses 
thought that costs were decreasing (Golberg 2018). The 
RSB reports that 71% of REFIT initiatives had quantified cost 
saving (RSB cited by Golberg 2018). 
iii. Despite a reduction in legislative output, the volume of 
delegated and implementing acts increased 
significantly. Additional monitoring and surveillance 
parameters in IA have been introduced (Van den Abeele 
2015). 
iv. Analysis shows that the REFIT Programme has legitimised 
the EC’s lack of action and has fulfilled its social agenda, but 
has not yet led to deregulation. On the contrary, some 
gaps have been identified which have led the EC to begin a 
legislative review process (Laulom 2018). 
v. The costs/benefits balance of the REFIT has never been 
questioned (Laulom 2018). 
(h) REFIT might affect the EC’s right of initiative, limiting the 
pursuit of Treaty-sanctioned goals, such as public health or 
environmental protection, by prioritising ‘alternative approaches’ 
when ‘regulatory costs are disproportionate to the goals pursued’. 
What ‘alternative approaches’ could entail remains far from 
defined (Alemanno 2015). 
(i) The REFIT programme did not necessarily lead to more 
evidence-based and risk-informed decisions (Lofstedt and 
Schlag, 2017)55.  
4. On the REFIT Platform 
(a) There is a narrow focus on reducing regulatory burden 
(Alemanno 2015; Smismans 2017), which raises questions also 
on the appropriateness of its institutional design to bridge the 
gap between policy-makers and stakeholders (Alemanno 2015). 
(b) The current set-up has significant shortcomings (Voermans 
2016): 
i. it seems to work on an ad hoc basis and is not itself able 
to carry out systematic studies (Voermans 2016); 
ii. the work of the REFIT Platform is not anchored in the 
standard decision-making processes (Voermans 2016). 
(c) The composition of the group reflects the prioritization of the 
regulatory burden as an objective of REFIT (Smismans 2017). 
                                           
(54)  Zbíral R. (2018). The Better Regulation Agenda and the Deactivation of EU Competences: 
Limits and Opportunities. In S. Garben and I. Govaere (Eds.), The EU Better Regulation 
Agenda: A Critical Assessment. Bloomsbury Publishing. cited in (Garben 2018). 
(55) Note: the authors here refer to examples before 2015. 
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(d) The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) was 
included in the group of stakeholders, causing outrage in 
the EESC quarters who believe they belong to an institution 
rather than being yet another stakeholder (Dunlop and Radaelli, 
2017). 
(e) It is a top-down process, in which the EC leads the REFIT 
Platform which in turns drives the Lighten the load portal 
(Alemanno 2018). 
(f) Whilst aimed at stakeholder involvement, it is expected not to 
politicise the debate (Smismans 2017). However, there is a 
high risk of ending up as a forum for political discussion 
reproducing already existing cleavages (Jarlbæk Pedersen 
2017). 
5. The Lighten the load – Have your say portal has a very low 
impact: 
(a) the focus seems very much only on whether the existing 
regulatory framework is too burdensome (Smismans 
2017);  
(b) it has well-known self-selection biases typical of online 
consultations56 (Ranchordas 2017; Sarpi 2015). 
6. In the BR there is little attention to some other crucial issues 
(Radaelli and Schrefler, 2015): 
(a) alternatives to traditional regulation (Radaelli and Schrefler, 
2015); 
(b) draw on cognitive and behavioral economics to design regulation 
(Radaelli and Schrefler, 2015). 
4.3 Overarching remarks  
1. There are concerns about a deregulation policy agenda (Dawson 
2016; Delogu 2016; Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Laulom 
2018; Van den Abeele 2015). 
(a) It is unclear whether 'reduce regulatory burden' implies 
deregulation. There is a danger that the decision-making 
process will be subjugated to technocratic and cost-focused 
criteria and procedures. Negative repercussions such as 
'paralysis by analysis' or lower protection are to be expected 
(Pachl 2015). 
(b) Certain elements of the BR 2015 risk a systematic bias against 
regulatory standards, particularly to pursue non-economic 
interests (Garben and Govaere 2018).  
                                           
(56) For example, the most vulnerable stakeholders might not have the digital skills to offer their 
contribution (Ranchordas 2017). 
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i. BR is defined largely in terms of implementing 
costs, a framing that may in itself be unfriendly to 
legislation aiming at non-market objectives (Dawson 
2016). 
ii. The preference for quantification is not neutral vis-à-
vis different EU objectives. It may be far easier to 
quantify costs associated with market impacts (Dawson 
2016). One of the main methodologies used in IAs and 
evaluations is cost-benefit analysis, which poses a 
number of problems in terms for the quantification of 
non-quantifiable benefits57.  
iii. There are doubts about how objective BR 
assessments are from a methodological 
perspective (subsidiarity is operationalised in IA in a 
default preference for ‘non-regulatory alternatives’; the 
REFIT has the explicit aim to address burdensome 
regulation; Garben, 2018). 
iv. The administrative resources and the expected 
burdens and difficulties of passing an IA may deter 
from developing new proposals from the outset, most 
likely in the non-economic policy areas (Garben and 
Govaere 2018) 
(c) Certain stakeholders and interests, such as SMEs, have a 
privileged position within the measuring of policy impacts 
(Dawson 2016). Exceptions for microenterprises and SMEs are 
not always acceptable. What constitutes a burden for some is a 
necessary protection or right for others (Pachl 2015).  
(d) The danger is that the main targets of REFIT will be proposals 
whose implementation costs are high, such as those which 
implement the EU’s environmental and social acquis (Dawson 
2016; Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017; Laulom 2018; Renda 
2015). The BR has been regarded with suspicion by most of 
the NGOs and other organisations focusing on health, safety, 
environmental, consumer and worker protection, which have 
seen it has a business/lobby-driven approach aimed at 
deregulation (Delogu 2016). 
(e) There is a strong emphasis on conceptualising subsidiarity in 
terms of a preference for the use of less harmonising and 
hierarchical regulatory instruments (Dawson 2016). 
(f) An excessive focus on simpler, flexible and more lenient 
regulation may result in an opposite outcome, with high 
cost to business, market disruption, loss of competitiveness and 
jobs loss (Delogu 2016). 
(g) The assessment of the legitimacy of the BR as a tool of 
'deregulation' depends on the EC’s proper constitutional 
                                           
(57)  Renda A. (2018). Cost-Benefit Analysis and EU Policy: Limits and Opportunities. In S. 
Garben and I. Govaere (Eds.), The EU Better Regulation Agenda: A Critical Assessment. 
Bloomsbury Publishing cited in (Garben and Govaere 2018) 
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role. What, under the 'regulatory paradigm', may be improper – 
the prioritising, for example, of competitiveness over social 
Treaty objectives – is legitimate if we accept a politicised role of 
the EC (Dawson 2016). 
(h) The BR does nothing to address the EU-induced deregulation 
on the national level that triggers the need for EU reregulation 
(Garben 2018). 
(i) Politically, there is tension between the deregulatory vision 
of some Council formations and some MSs, and the approach 
of the EC (Radaelli 2018), as shown by controversy on the 
feasibility of an EU-wide business impact target (Renda 2017b). 
2. On the relationship between regulatory and political aspects. 
(a) Regulatory streamlining is not simply a technical matter, 
but it involves making political choices (Eliantonio and 
Spendzharova 2017).  
(b) Proposals with the higher risk of politicisation dominate even 
among the regulatory proposals (Jarlbæk Pedersen 2017). 
(c) The BR has been used foremost as an instrument of control 
of which proposals to adopt and which to withdraw (Alemanno 
2018).  
3. Withdrawal of proposals may be worrying for the EU’s 
legitimacy, as well as for the EC authority and competence 
(Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
4. The implicit assumption that there is indeed a problem of 
over-regulation in the EU system is not so evident (Garben 
2018).  
(a) There are significant methodological biases in the 
calculation of the 'regulatory burden'. There is no evidence 
for a cause-and-effect relationship established between the 
volume of EU regulations, on the one hand, and the EU’s 
prosperity, on the other hand  (Van den Abeele 2015). 
(b) This aim is based on evidence on perceptions of a 
problem and on political choices. Indeed, the narrative of an 
over-regulating EU stands in stark contrast to competing 
accounts of the EU’s regulatory asymmetry, said to lead to an 
overall deregulatory bias in European integration (Garben 2018). 
(c) The BR is a counterproductive policy: by formulating ‘EU 
over-regulation’ as a part of the problem definition, feeds the 
existence of the very problem that it intends to solve (Garben 
2018). The message is that the EU produces legislation that is 
not fit for purpose. This even reinforces mistrust of the EU (Van 
den Abeele 2015). 
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(d) The BR is criticised both by Euro-sceptics, arguing that the 
regulatory process creates red tape, and by those supporting 
regional integration, expressing concerns that the efforts fall 
short of the true ambitions of the European project (Willems 
2016). 
5. A crucial aspect is the relationship between EU regulation and 
the rule of law (Dawson 2016).  
(a) On the one hand, the package provides mechanisms to 
rationalise EU policy-making, and to make judicial review 
easier (Dawson 2016). 
(b) On the other, it promotes the channeling of regulation through 
mechanisms in which normal processes of interinstitutional 
consultation and judicial review are limited. The principle 
danger is that the CJEU increasingly confines its review to formal 
assessment of whether an IA has been conducted58. 
Furthermore, the current BR package is far more 
accommodating of alternative methods of regulation that 
may either escape normal legislative procedures, or be difficult 
to review judicially at national or EU levels (Dawson 2016). 
6. The legitimacy of the BR 2015 is also debated (Garben and 
Govaere 2018). 
(a) The BR 2015 shows growing independence from political 
authority through its institutionalisation (for example, by 
autonomous institutions like the RSB). This raises questions 
about its democratic legitimacy (Garben and Govaere 2018). 
i. Certain of the Agenda’s objectives are conducive to 
legitimacy, such as commitments to participatory 
government through public consultation and to 
transparency (Garben and Govaere 2018).  
ii. Others are instead about curbing political discretion in 
pursuit of the ‘regulatory paradigm’ of evidence-based 
policy. In some cases, legitimacy could be found in the 
EU Treaties  (examples: explicit subsidiarity component 
in IAs), but there are some constitutional 
arguments against certain aspects of the BR 2015 
(for example, the BR 2015 at times hostile stance 
towards higher national regulatory standards) (Garben 
and Govaere 2018). 
(b) The BR 2015 fails as a substantive reform agenda and as a 
public relations exercise designed to combat criticisms that 
                                           
(58)  As long as preparing an IA is optional, as confirmed by the latest BR package, the lack of an 
IA could not be itself the reason for annulment. However, as follows from the CJEU judiciary 
review, the evaluation of the assessment studies usually does not result in the annulment of 
the contested EU measure (Maśnicki 2016). 
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the EU suffers from onerous regulations that strangle 
businesses59. 
4.4 Main observations from the literature review 
1. By formulating ‘EU over-regulation’ as a part of the problem definition 
that it is aimed at addressing, the BR 2015 feeds the existence of the 
very problem that it intends to solve. It would be more effective to 
engage in a positive public relations exercise on the benefits 
of EU regulation instead60.  
2. If the political aim is to freeze regulatory activity and to deregulate, 
there are less costly ways to achieve the same result, such as 
legislative moratoria. If there are unnecessary costs, irritation or 
other burden, zero in on that legislation or areas of legislation so that 
tailored cost reduction measures can be developed (Golberg 2018). 
3. Adopt a sequential approach to cost reduction by setting 
reduction targets in selected policy areas, and gradually build capacity 
on the quantification of regulatory costs for all the relevant EU's 
acquis (Renda 2017b).  
4. The EC should clarify the REFIT concept and mainstream its 
presentation and its use to avoid the perception that REFIT is 
separate from the standard BR cycle (ECA 2018). 
5. In REFIT, the EC needs to function as an effective gatekeeper to 
ensure depoliticisation (Jarlbæk Pedersen 2017). 
6. Equip the EU with smart rules forcing the paradigm of 'all for 
competitiveness' to be replaced with a 'smart revolution for 
sustainable development' (Van den Abeele 2015). 
 
 
                                           
(59)  Kelemen R.D. (2018). Eurolegalism and the Better Regulation Agenda. In S. Garben and I. 
Govaere (Eds.), The EU Better Regulation Agenda: A Critical Assessment. Bloomsbury 
Publishing. cited in (Garben 2018). 
(60)  Kelemen R.D. (2018). Eurolegalism and the Better Regulation Agenda. In S. Garben and I. 
Govaere (Eds.), The EU Better Regulation Agenda: A Critical Assessment. Bloomsbury 
Publishing. cited in (Garben 2018). 
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5 Regulatory Scrutiny and quality assurance 
5.1 [Achievements] A redefined scrutiny body as an 
important achievement … 
1. The RSB has a renewed composition and dedicated personnel 
(Chase and Schlosser 2015), which promise to enhance its 
independence (Alemanno 2015; ECA 2018; Leszczyńska 2018; 
Radaelli 2018; Stoffel 2015), as illustrated by the number of negative 
opinions it has issued (ECA 2018). 
2. The RSB can handle different types of scrutiny including 
evaluation and fitness checks (Alemanno 2015; Delogu 2016; ECA 
2018; Radaelli 2018; Stoffel 2015). 
(a) This will strengthen the overall capacity and inject a more 
holistic approach to its quality control mechanism (Alemanno 
2015). 
(b) The new Guidelines also appear to increase the procedural 
coherence of the EC’s IA process (EPRS 2015).  
i. This involves strengthening the role of the SG and of 
the RSB (EPRS 2015). 
ii. All members of the RSB are now attached to the SG of 
the EC, whereas before they retained a stronger link with 
their DG of origin (EPRS 2015).  
iii. It is now more clear that the positive opinion of the RSB 
is necessary for any initiative to go ahead (Delogu 2016; 
EPRS 2015; Stoffel 2015). 
(c) The EU approach is at the policy frontier, ahead of the 
corresponding oversight body in the US (Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, OIRA), which is yet not involved in 
retrospective analysis on a regular basis (Broughel 2015). 
3. The opinion of the RSB adds transparency (Lofstedt and Schlag 
2017; Radaelli 2018) and flags up issues to be considered in the 
legislative procedure. The latter are valuable even when, for political 
reasons, the EC would still carry on with proposals despite negative 
RSB opinions (Radaelli 2018). 
4. In the terms of the good governance requirements the tasks 
conducted by the RSB fit in the accountability (Maśnicki 2016). 
5. The emergence of oversight bodies in both the US and the EU 
confirms the desirability of regulatory oversight (Wiener and 
Alemanno 2017). 
6. The shift of consumer protection and fundamental rights and 
principles from the Guidelines to the Toolbox has not stopped the 
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RSB from considering these principles and the Charter (van Schagen 
2017). 
 
5.2 [Issues] …but RSB resources and mechanisms to 
enforce its decisions could be improved 
1. RSB composition 
(a) The RSB retains the character of an ‘in-house’ body 
(Meuwese 2015; Meuwese 2017). The transformation of the 
IA Board is a partial one only. A tripartite Board for all three 
institutions seems to be the end game, but the institutions are 
not ready yet for such a radical institutional design (Meuwese, 
2015). 
(b) Considering the amount of work done, RSB members are not 
adequately supported by a team of economists and social 
scientists (Radaelli, 2018a). 
(c) The lack of a dedicated secretariat separate from the SG of 
the EC poses a risk to its independence (ECA 2018). 
(d) The RSB has been granted little new power or authority and 
remains insulated from stakeholder input (Chase and Schlosser 
2015). 
(e) It took 2 years for the RSB to be fully staffed; slow process 
could be interpreted as lack of commitment (Impact Assessment 
Institute 2017). 
(f) The head of the RSB chairs the REFIT platforms, deputising the 
first Vice-President on this exercise. However, there is no 
conceptual connection between the RSB scrutiny activity and 
the REFIT platforms (Radaelli 2018). This could jeopardise the 
perception of the independence of the RSB (ECA 2018). 
(g) It is not easy to ensure the independence and impartiality of 
external experts (Sarpi 2015; Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
Since external members are temporary agents, the ‘revolving 
door’ phenomenon should be avoided (Meuwese 2015). 
(h) The relationship between the external and internal 
members might affect overall independence. The voting rules 
may split the insiders over the outsiders (Alemanno 2015).  
(i) The underlying idea of the EC seems to be that ultimate 
responsibility on quality should be outsourced to be 
credible (Sarpi 2015). The addition of three 'independent' 
members reflects interest in external expert input (Wiener and 
Alemanno 2017).  
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i. It is not clear if this solution ultimately hinders or 
enhances confidence in the neutrality of these 
assessments (Sarpi 2015). 
ii. True independence is most likely unattainable and 
perhaps also undesirable, given the need to retain the 
IA relevance to the policy process. The question is then 
which model for quality control of IA approximates 
‘independence’ most fittingly (A. Meuwese, 2015). 
2. RSB role and procedure  
(a) Once the RSB has approved an IA, it does not seem to have a 
clear way to ensure that all its recommendations are there 
reflected (van Schagen 2017). 
(b) There is an issue of legitimisation of the RSB role in the 
institutional structure, since its appointment is not discussed 
in the EP. This could be interpreted as a partial privatisation of 
the EC’s decision-making process (Van den Abeele 2015). 
(c) The competences of the RSB will need to be examined with 
respect to the REFIT Platform, especially when they come to 
different conclusions (Maśnicki 2016). 
(d) Ex-post reviews other than evaluations are not within the 
scope of competence of the RSB (ECA 2018). 
(e) There is a risk that the RSB will become the censor of 
legislative activity (Van den Abeele 2015). 
(f) No formal appeal proceeding is foreseen against an RSB 
opinion, differently from the US  (Wiener and Alemanno 2017).  
(g) The role of the RSB is more fragmented compared to the 
corresponding body in the US (OIRA) (Wiener and Alemanno 
2017): 
i. The RSB’s (and, previously, the IAB’s) review of proposals 
for legislation occurs much earlier in the policy cycle, 
before further amendments and the details of 
implementation are worked out (Wiener and Alemanno 
2017). 
ii. The RSB (and, previously, IAB’s) oversight role is nested in 
other bodies, including the CJEU, the ECA, and the 
European Ombudsman (Wiener and Alemanno 2017). 
iii. The positioning of the RSB may mean it is less 
political, but also potentially weaker than in OIRA, 
which functions as part of the Executive Office of the 
President (Broughel 2015). 
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(h) The Toolbox and the Charter do not serve as a basis for 
evaluation by the RSB (van Schagen 2017): 
i. the guidance on how to analyse measures’ impact on 
consumer protection is provided only by the Toolbox and 
not by the Guidelines (van Schagen 2017); 
ii. non-compliance with fundamental principles does not 
necessarily lead to a negative opinion (van Schagen 
2017). 
 
5.3 Overarching remarks61  
1. In general, there is a fundamental question about who is and 
should be in control of the life cycle of a policy. Behind the 
emergence of the RSB lies a tension between those MSs in favour of a 
totally independent oversight body, and the EC, for which this should 
remain a component of the internal process of monitoring and 
learning (Radaelli, 2018a). 
2. In most of the recent legislation, performance objectives and 
indicators together with evaluation and reporting arrangements 
made the scrutiny activity more relevant. Review clauses should raise 
scrutiny from a technocratic exercise to a more political dimension 
(De Feo 2017). 
3. The BR programmes themselves have never as such been 
subjected to such evaluation (Voermans 2016).  
4. New procedures and institutions to improve the quality of EU 
legislation have been put into place. But the mere existence of 
medicine can never in itself provide the proof that the disease 
has been cured (Voermans 2016). 
5. While the BR seemingly addresses poor legislative quality, since 
EU’s diversity is the root cause of the problem and cannot realistically 
be resolved, the BR is fighting an unwinnable battle (Garben 
2018). 
6. In the absence of agreed indicators, it is difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions on the performance of the BR (Golberg 
2018).  
(a) The RSB requests resubmission in relatively more cases 
than the UK’s scrutiny body.   
(b) The RSB estimates that only around 4% of IAs failed to take 
comments of the Board into account.  
                                           
(61)  Authors also report general considerations on the quality assessment of the BR 2015 itself. 
Since these remarks are related to the quality assurance of the process, they are reported 
both in this section and in the Concluding remarks. 
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(c) The ECA recently released a special report (ECA 2018) on the 
ex-post review of EU legislation (see related text in the present 
document).  
(d) The EC internal audit department concluded in 2016 that 
there was a continuous improvement of the process and of the 
development of comprehensive guidelines and that the BR tools 
are embedded in policy preparation processes and generally 
accepted. Critical elements are the lack of a monitoring 
framework and low participation in stakeholder consultation. 
They also pointed to the need to continue to foster a ‘BR culture’ 
and to communicate more clearly on the internal workflows for 
policy development.  
(e) The EP and the Council review mechanisms have usually 
supported the opinions of the RSB in their documents. 
7. There is no judicial scrutiny over the obligation to respect 
fundamental BR principles throughout the process (as e.g. in the 
US) (Renda 2016). 
8. The RSB oversight activity on evaluation is a novelty and capacity 
will have to be built (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2017). 
5.4 Main observations from the literature review 
5.4.1 Observations related to BR quality assessment 
1. Adopt a broad view (notably on goals) when evaluating the success 
of EU Better law-making and regulation policies (Voermans 2016). 
2. Any evaluation will have to be problem-oriented: addressing 
complaints and concerns about EU legislation is the yardstick for 
success (Voermans 2016).  
5.4.2 Observations related to BR 
1. In IAs, state clearly if a political decision is made to continue 
despite a negative opinion of the RSB, and explain in full the 
reasoning for continuing with the proposal (Impact Assessment 
Institute 2017). 
2. Based on other existing models like the Council of State model and 
the Offices of Goodness in the US, consider adding to the toolkit 
of the RSB (Meuwese 2015): 
(a) a type of complaint investigation (Meuwese 2015);  
(b) the possibility to scrutinise IAs as they are being 
prepared instead of just the ‘end products’ (Meuwese 2015). 
3. Seek external members capable of measuring whether 
regulations benefit society as a whole, including non-economic 
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impacts of regulations such as health, safety, citizens’ well-being and 
the environment (Pachl 2015). 
4. Improve citizens capacity to understand, and engage with 
inevitably imperfect legal texts (Garben 2018). 
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6 Transparency in policy making in the context of 
BR 
6.1 [Achievements] Enhanced openness, in particular 
concerning information on evaluations… 
1. Compared to other organisations and national entities, the EU is one 
of the most transparent structures in the world (Willermain and 
Cioriciu 2015). 
2. The BR strives to further open up EU policymaking for public 
participation (through extended consultations) and therewith 
make the EU more transparent and accountable (Jancic 2015; 
Willermain and Cioriciu 2015).  
3. The open web portal where legislative initiatives could be 
tracked is one very welcome component of the reform since it is a 
crucial tool for transparency and was supposed to be in full swing a 
long time ago (Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
4. There is an improved accessibility to the information on 
evaluation. 
(a) The idea that the evaluation should feed back into the political 
decision-making process underpins the EC's attention to 
ensuring better communication and transparency, so as to 
increase the number of actors that can be involved in the 
'policy-learning' process (Smismans 2015). 
(b) Implementation of the 2015 BR Guidelines has clarified the 
status of ongoing and planned EC evaluations considerably, 
by making fully centralised and easily accessible the relevant 
information. Roadmaps are in many respects the most 
informative source of information on planned and ongoing 
evaluations and fitness checks (EPRS 2017). 
(c) The Interinstitutional Database of EU Studies62 has the 
potential to become the internal 'one-stop-shop' on planned, 
ongoing, and completed evaluation work in the EU 
institutions (EPRS 2017). 
(d) The publication of the Overview of Commission’s Completed 
Evaluations and Studies63 in 2016 is a welcome addition to 
the existing sources (EPRS 2017)64. 
5. Compared to 2016, the RSB now tracks systematically 
quantification efforts in IAs and evaluations in its 2017 Report65. It 
                                           
(62) The Interinstitutional Database of EU Studies allows those working in the EU institutions to 
follow which external studies are currently being conducted for the Commission or have 
been published (EPRS 2017). 
(63) Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/finalised_studies_and_evaluations_2016.pdf 
(64)  The creation of a central database of evaluation files on the EC’s evaluation website is an 
important improvement, but it is not updated anymore (EPRS 2017; Smismans 2015). 
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also started to annex to its opinions, which are publicly available, the 
standardised tables suggested by the BR Toolbox for the preferred 
options (RSB SG and JRC Working Group 2018). 
6. The IIA is a significant step forward in the application of openness 
(Maśnicki 2016); in particular, it increases the quality and 
transparency of the pre-legislative process (Alemanno 2018).  
(a) The access for EP experts to documents and meetings 
concerning the preparation of delegated acts has improved 
(EPRS 2018).  
(b) On 12 December 2017, the joint register of delegated acts66 
became operational (EPRS 2018). 
(c) The IIA sets out a common understanding of the timing and 
processes to make the legislative cycle more transparent 
(De Feo 2017).  
7. The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) is arguably 
contributing to more informed and transparent law making, in line 
with the goals of the BR 2015 (Stephenson 2017). 
8. Compared to the US, the EU pre-legislative process, even before 
2015, was more transparent, rigorous and inclusive of 
stakeholders, largely due to the almost systematic use of IA (Parker 
and Alemanno 2015). 
 
6.2 [Issues] …but there are still deficiencies in 
information completeness, accessibility, consistency 
and timeliness 
1. Issues concerning transparency of evaluations. 
(a) It is complicated to obtain a complete picture of finalised 
evaluations, even more so for the wider public (EPRS 2017). 
i. The central database of evaluation files is not 
exhaustive (Smismans 2015). 
ii. There is diversity in the amount of information 
available on DG websites (EPRS 2017; Smismans 2015). 
iii. The Overview of Commission’s Completed Evaluations 
and Studies published in 2016 has no date; it is unclear 
whether and how often it will be updated and if it will 
become the main reference source on completed EC 
evaluations (EPRS 2017). 
                                                                                                                  
(65) Regulatory Scrutiny Board (2018).  
(66) Available at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/regdel/#/home.  
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iv. It is difficult to access original studies, for example 
because of outdated links. Sometimes only an executive 
summary is provided (EPRS 2017). 
2. Issues concerning transparency of IAs. 
(a) The internal nature of the draft IA report combined with the 
delayed disclosure of its final version make it:  
i. difficult to determine whether the IA actually 
influenced the proposal (Van den Abeele 2015; Wiener 
and Alemanno 2017)67; there is also lack of transparency 
behind the decisions to submit or not certain legislative 
proposals where the IAs were ignored or not conducted at 
all (Van den Abeele 2015); 
ii. difficult for the public to comment on the draft proposal 
(Wiener and Alemanno 2017). 
(b) Background data and analysis of impacts (Impact Assessment 
Institute 2017): 
i. lack a synopsis of key data and findings;  
ii. lack transparency regarding calculations and modelling 
(input data, algorithms, raw output data). 
(c) Many documents, in particular long ones such as complex IAs, 
are split into a number of separate files. This requires more 
effort to access and store, whilst reducing transparency (Impact 
Assessment Institute 2017). 
3. The location of RSB (and previously, IAB) reviews in the 
regulatory process limits its transparency. RSB opinions are 
released only when the EC has adopted the corresponding legislative 
proposal. Thus the public does not have an opportunity to see and 
comment on the draft proposals and draft IAs before they are final 
(Wiener and Alemanno 2017).  
4. There are implementation issues on the IIA: negotiations on 
information-sharing when negotiating and concluding international 
agreements have still to be concluded (EPRS 2018).  
 
6.3 Overarching remarks 
1. The lack of homogeneity of the various components of the BR 
Package (language, targets, nature and underlying philosophies) 
limits the understanding of the procedures governing the 
preparation, adoption and implementation of acts and thus the 
inclusiveness (Alemanno 2015). 
                                           
(67)  The author gives examples behind this statement that are prior to the launch of the BR in 
2015. 
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2. Transparency has also been used to avoid blame for the state of 
EU's regulation: in fact, the REFIT scoreboards are built in such a way 
as to differentiate the regulatory costs created by EU regulation from 
the responsibility of the MSs (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017).  
6.4 Main observations from the literature review 
1. To close the policy cycle all the EU institutions and the MSs should 
provide information about (Radaelli and Schrefler 2015):  
(a) who does what;  
(b) how the different actors will be accountable for the results;  
(c) how these results will be measured;  
(d) in what type of institutional forum the results will be 
discussed.  
2. There is a need of a fast-paced transparency spillover into the areas 
where transparency is currently the exception and not the norm 
(Willermain and Cioriciu 2015): 
(a) the EU should have a more automatic and swift system of 
response when dealing with access to documents; 
(b) sporadic litigations should not define EU transparency;  
(c) the citizens should be able to clearly grasp the legislative flow 
and be familiar with the contributors who make decisions 
affecting their lives;  
(d) EU leadership should prioritise the Transparency Register 
making it mandatory, and implement it in all EU institutions. 
3. Move away from fish-bowl transparency to science-based 
transparency, where some specific data are shared but at the same 
time explained (Lofstedt and Schlag 2017). 
4. Adopt editorial measures that could facilitate the communication of 
IA and evaluations (RSB SG and JRC Working Group 2018). 
5. For evaluations, it would be helpful:  
(a) to set up a publicly available repository, underlying external 
studies (if present) and other related information (EPRS 2017); 
(b) to signal any significant delays or changes of scope to the 
evaluation/fitness check in the original roadmap (EPRS 2017). 
6. For IAs:  
(a) publish all evidence used for IA: include the original studies 
as an annex to the Commission SWDs and, where possible, the 
underlying data (EPRS 2017), models and algorithms, also those 
related to Inception IAs. The analytical model should be 
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published by default at as early a stage as possible (Impact 
Assessment Institute 2017); 
(b) explain all evidence used for IA (Impact Assessment Institute 
2017); 
(c) make IAs on subordinate legislation available at the stage of 
consultations on its draft, with the opportunity to comment on 
the analysis (OECD 2018).  
7. For the implementation of the IIA, there should be: 
(a) a better flow of information from the Council; 
(b) greater efforts to set up a joint database on the state of play 
of legislative acts; 
(c) more transparency from MSs about ‘gold-plating’ when 
transposing EU legislation (EPRS 2018).  
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7 Interinstitutional relations in the context of the 
BR68 
7.1 [Achievements] The IIA is a step towards a greater 
coordination amongst the EU bodies, essential to 
improve legislation… 
1) The IIA is the most important part and the major novelty in the 
BR 2015 (Alemanno 2015; Maśnicki 2016). It confirms a procedural 
framework of interinstitutional cooperation which is essential to 
progress in the direction of more effective EU legislation (De Feo 
2017). 
8. A small step is made towards voluntary cooperation between the 
three institutions (Van den Abeele 2015).  
9. The reference to law-making instead of regulation goes beyond 
the BR to capture in principle all law-making activities where the 
three main institutions of the EU need to co-operate on evidence-
based policy (Radaelli 2018)69.  
10. The IIA is a further step towards defining some common principles 
shared by the Council, the EC and the EP. It sets out a common 
understanding of the timing and processes. This has led to a better 
coordination upstream of the policy process (De Feo 2017). 
(a) The IIA recognises the whole policy cycle (Stephenson 2017). 
(b) The three institutions define annual lists of the EU’s 
legislative priorities (Alemanno 2018; De Feo 2017; EPRS 
2018; Maśnicki 2016; Sarpi 2015). 
(c) The EC commits to give serious consideration to the 
requests made by the EP or the Council (Sarpi 2015). 
(d) The access for EP experts to documents and meetings 
concerning the preparation of delegated acts has improved. 
The joint register of delegated acts became operational in 
December 2017 (EPRS 2018). 
11. BR tools, and namely IAs, are increasingly used in a systematic 
way by the EP and the Council in the working groups of the 
legislature (Golberg 2018).  
(a) The EP has considerably stepped up its efforts on IAs and 
evaluations (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017; EPRS 2016), as well as 
                                           
(68) Note that reports prepared by the EPRS are also included in this section for consistency with 
what has been done in the remainder of the text. These reports also include statements 
assessing the activities of the EP itself.  
(69) Note as well the interpretation of (Cărăuşan 2016): 'The Better regulation system is about 
the whole policy cycle, from planning, implementation and evaluation to monitoring and 
revision. It is a more comprehensive concept than 'better law-making', which refers only to 
the process of law-making (meaning the preparation, drafting and enactment of legal acts)'. 
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invested in capacity building to exercise oversight of the EC’s IAs 
and evaluations (Radaelli 2018; Renda 2017a).  
i. The work of the EPRS complements what the RSB 
does (Radaelli 2018) and can be regarded as the result of 
the weak pre-existing evaluation capacity within the EU 
institutions (Stephenson 2017). In the last five years, the 
EPRS is beginning to play an important role in learning 
(Stephenson 2017). 
ii. There is an emerging role of the EPRS in monitoring 
the outputs of the ECA and other bodies engaged in 
audit and evaluation. While all scrutiny by MEPs is 
inherently political, it is less likely that reports drafted by 
the EPRS will have a political agenda (Stephenson 2017). 
(b) The Council’s engagement is recent, and rather in IA than 
evaluation (EPRS 2016). Its secretariat has elaborated a 
procedure so that the different formations should start their 
discussion with an examination of the underlying IA. They have 
responded with different degrees of commitment. The 
secretariat of the Council, which is endemically under-staffed to 
produce IAs, launched a tender in autumn 2017 for a framework 
contract to support this analytical work (Radaelli 2018). 
Moreover, the Council has stressed the importance of 
cooperation between the EC and the MSs to ensure that data 
required for monitoring and evaluation purposes are adequately 
collected (EPRS 2016). 
(c) EC's assistance with the IAs can boost the use of IA among 
the three institutions (Sarpi 2015).  
(d) The preparatory work done in IAs strengthens the EC in 
negotiations and contributes to more rapid agreement on 
proposals and to the downward trend of infringements of 
EU law by the MSs (Golberg 2018).  
 
7.2 [Issues] …but the effect on the institutional balance 
is unclear 
7.2.1 Issues related to the institutional framework 
1. The attempt of the EC to bind the EP, the Council and the MSs in 
relation to openness, participation and evidence-based policy-making, 
raises serious doubts about the compatibility with the principles 
of (Alemanno 2015): 
(a) the separation of powers (Alemanno 2015); 
(b) the institutional balance laid down by the Treaties (Alemanno 
2015; Dawson 2016).  
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i. The EC’s role in the legislative procedure after the adoption of 
its proposal cannot amount to transform the EC into a co-
legislator (Alemanno 2015). 
ii. A high level of control by a non-democratically elected 
institution could be seen at odds with the concept of 
representative democracy enshrined in the TEU (Willems 
2016)70. 
iii. The EC seems to be attempting to increase its power 
(‘power-grab’) (Alemanno 2015; Pachl 2015). Some 
examples are:  
1. an entirely new consultation period following directly 
the adoption of an EC proposal (Pachl 2015): 
a. the EC occupies a new position as an intermediary and 
knowledge pool for citizens’ concerns; 
b. it would increase the EC’s control over imminent 
changes that might be tabled in the legislative 
procedure; 
c. it would provide advance warning about what IA could 
be required from EP or Council; 
2. political validation from the lead Commissioner, 
Vice-President and First Vice President for 'major' 
new initiatives, before any policy appraisal work can 
start, may limit the discretion attributed to the EC services 
in adopting new initiatives (Renda 2015);  
3. ‘technical assistance’ by the EC in the IA work of the 
co-legislators, which is set to inevitably interfere with 
their exercise of political discretion (Alemanno 2015). 
iv. The inclusion of the criteria that call to carry out IAs in the 
IIA has a more strict character than in the last 2003 IIA 
(Maśnicki, 2016). However, there seems to be little legal 
basis for the idea that EU institutions are obliged to conduct 
IAs, or even to follow those of the EC (Dawson 2016).  
v. While IAs had some appeal for the EP as a tool to hold the EC 
accountable, they also carry the risk of making EC's 
proposals ‘bullet-proof’ and making later changes to 
legislative proposals more difficult (Wegrich 2015). 
vi. The appointment of members of the RSB extends the 
power game between the institutions into another round 
(Wegrich 2015). 
2. The IIA shows weakness as an instrument. 
(a) The restatement of the joint responsibility hides the lack of a 
real attribution of responsibility to the EP and most 
importantly to the Council, the most reluctant of all EU 
institutions when it comes to evidence-based decision-making 
(Renda 2015; Renda 2016). It indicates some continued 
resistance by the EU’s legislative institutions to regulatory 
                                           
(70) See the results of the substantive analysis conducted by Willems (2016). 
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models which constrain their freedom of political action (Dawson 
2016).  
(b) The final version was heavily watered down. IAs on 
amendments are not mandatory anymore (Willems 2016), and 
there is no more mention of a tripartite ‘Joint Panel’ that would 
be tasked with assessing the quality of such IAs (Meuwese, 
2017); also the EC proposals on 'gold-plating' were diluted 
(Dawson 2016). 
(c) There is no full agreement among the institutions about the 
level of control of the EC over the legislative agenda and 
process. The EC’s inability to come to a truly coordinated 
approach on IAs has severe adverse effects on both the duration 
and transparency of the legislative process (Willems 2016). 
(d) The IIA is one of the most important negotiations as it defines 
how the three main institutions will work together, however it 
seems no longer the number one priority, but instead a 
simple tool of the BR Package (Willermain and Cioriciu 
2015). 
3. There is a continuing recalibration of the EU’s institutional 
architecture (Wegrich, 2015).  
(a) The fact that experts and stakeholders can make their voices 
heard at a very early stage, but that the EP and the Council 
should carry out IAs on any substantial amendment that they 
propose, completely reverses the democratic system, which puts 
the co-legislators on the defensive and the EC at the centre of 
the political game (Van den Abeele 2015).  
(b) The traditional ‘Community method’ of policy-making – with the 
EC in the driver’s seat as the sole initiator of legislation – is 
increasingly sidelined by a range of intergovernmental forms 
of decision making around Euro crisis management and 
economic policy-making more widely (Wegrich, 2015).  
4. The BR 2015 seems to ignore the existence of the two 
institutionally recognised (i.e. treaty-based) advisory bodies: the 
EESC and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) (there is no reference 
in the IIA, despite the obligation for the EC, the EP and the Council to 
consult with them) (Willems 2016). 
5. The EC does not accept to take the blame for something that it has 
not done (blame shifting), by: 
(a) subjecting the legislators amendments to IA, in particular, on 
the regulatory costs (Radaelli and Schrefler 2015); 
(b) greater monitoring of transposition into national legislation, 
by requesting detailed information on additional regulatory costs 
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2017; Radaelli and Schrefler 2015; Sarpi 
2015). 
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6. There are issues with the extension of the BR requirements to the 
MSs when it comes to the implementation of EU law (Alemanno 
2015).  
(a) It is an inappropriate instrument: an IIA by definition binds 
only its own parties. 
(b) There is a risk that any EU effort at countering gold plating 
might negatively affect the exercise of the MS’s regulatory 
autonomy.  
(c) The EC might be ‘gold plating’ the exercise of its own 
prerogatives by requiring MSs to perform an IA on their 
‘additional’ obligations.  
7.2.2 Issues related to implementation 
1. Better coordination upstream of the policy process and increased 
quality and transparency of the pre-legislative process have not 
translated into an acceleration in the rate of adoption of the EC's 
proposals by the co-legislators (Alemanno 2018).   
2. There are different levels of commitment to the BR, both in the 
pre-legislative phase – among the EC’s DGs – and in the 
legislative phase, by the co-legislators (Alemanno 2015).  
(a) The EPRS is currently more actively involved in providing early 
assessments of the EC’s IAs than in evaluating the impacts of 
major amendments proposed by EP committees. More generally, 
the work of the EPRS often seems to be ignored by the Members 
of the EP, also due to the wide distance between the logic of 
cost-benefit analysis and that of political decision-making71.  
(b) The Council is making more use of the EC's IA, but has so far 
failed to develop its own capacity for IA and evaluation (Renda 
2017a). 
(c) The Council is reluctant to accept the use of delegated acts, 
despite the concessions made regarding the consultation of 
national experts in the preparation of such acts (EPRS 2018). 
(d) IAs explain the rationale of the original proposal filed by the EC, 
but not of the final text approved at the end of the ordinary 
legislative procedure (Renda 2017a). 
3. The EC in some cases decides by itself to use delegated acts. This is 
at odds with the IIA, which states that 'it is the competence of the 
legislator to decide whether and to what extent to use delegated or 
implementing acts' (Bartlett 2018). 
  
                                           
(71) Renda, A. (2016), 'European Union', in Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), 
Handbook of Regulatory Impact Assessment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, cited in 
(Renda 2017a). 
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4. On IAs of amendments. 
(a) The concept of ‘substantial amendments’ deserves a clear 
definition by the EC (Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
(b) There are implementation questions linked to the preparation 
of the IAs of amendments and the trialogues, concerning time 
frame (Alemanno 2015) and process (Alemanno 2015; Radaelli 
and Schrefler 2015).  
(c) The Council and the EP lack political ownership of the 
evaluation mechanisms used by the EC (De Feo 2017). IAs 
for each significant amendment suggested by legislators risk 
significantly slowing down and complicating the decision-making 
process, as well as generating increased administrative burdens 
(Pachl 2015; Van den Abeele 2015; Willermain and Cioriciu 
2015). They should not overload or even substitute for the 
political character of the EU legislative mechanism (Willermain 
and Cioriciu 2015). 
(d) The use of IAs by the Council could be used by some MSs as a 
tool for blocking or 'indefinitely' postponing a proposal 
(Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
(e) Quality control of IAs remains under the responsibility of 
each institution (Van den Abeele 2015). 
5. Negotiations have still to be concluded on (EPRS 2018): 
(a) information-sharing when negotiating and concluding 
international agreements;  
(b) the non-binding criteria for delineation of delegated and 
implementing acts. 
 
7.3 Overarching remarks 
There are political issues in the interinstitutional relationships.  
1. The EC wants to ensure that responsibilities for inefficiency and 
poor quality of regulatory outcomes are separate. It should be 
clear to the public if and when the EP, the Council or the MSs 
generate higher compliance costs (Radaelli 2018; Radaelli and 
Schrefler 2015). 
(a) For both the EP and the Council, evidence-based activities 
stand in the way of more political discussions (Radaelli 
2018).  
(b) The Council is notoriously hostile to raising awareness on 
the regulatory responsibility of MSs in implementing and 
delivering EU legislation ('gold-plating') (Radaelli 2018).  
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(c) The Council and the EC have competed over the definition of 
what the BR should be about. On specific details, the Council 
wants to see more emphasis on the reduction of 
administrative burdens (Radaelli 2018).  
2. The following features warrant the necessary vigilance in 
approaching the BR 2015 (Willems 2016). 
(a) The challenge of diverging interest is amplified. The self-
interest of the institutions involved accounts for an 
additional layer of complexity.  
(b) The BR is a horizontal policy that affects all the institutions. 
Therefore, it requires the institutions to engage in active and 
structural coordination, rather than respecting each 
institution’s distinct mandate.  
(c) IIAs are used to the extent they even alter the institutional 
design of the EU. 
3. The IIA has a strong political meaning. 
(a) The revamp of the BR initiative has more to do with honouring 
the political mandate of the EC than with a genuine desire to 
restructure the administrative governance of EU policy-making 
(Alemanno 2015). 
(b) The meaning of the joint declaration on the interinstitutional 
programming will be more of political than legal importance. The 
EP and the Council gain room for political influence on the 
EC’s exclusive right to set up legislative proposals (Maśnicki 
2016; Willems 2016). 
(c) On the contrary, others also argue that the BR agenda seems to 
place confines and limits on the ability of national and EU 
legislatures to amend policy according to purely political 
considerations (Dawson 2016).  
4. On the role of IAs:  
(a) BR 2015, and in particular an increased use of IAs and 
reinforced annual and multi-annual planning are among the 
instruments to improve the EC’s political leadership 
capacity in the dialogue with Council and EP, according to 
officials from the EC, the Council and the EP (Bürgin 2018)72. 
(b) The principle of institutional balance constitutes a clear 
limit to the establishment of binding IAs between EU 
institutions. A binding EC's IA would alter the democratic nature 
of the co-decision procedure (Nowag and Groussot 2018). 
                                           
(72) The analysis of Bürgin (2018) refers to the years 2015-2017. See Annex 3 for details. 
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(c) It is difficult to imagine that the IIA could succeed in practice 
without a consensual clarification of the role of the BR, 
notably of its IA system (Delogu 2016). 
5. In the end, for the SG, evaluation is a solution to the problem of 
creating policy leadership. The SG is today the ultimate custodian 
of guidance on both IA and evaluation. This, in fact, is also where the 
MSs, the SG, the EC's DGs and the EP test and constantly redefine 
the question of who has control over EU policy (Dunlop and Radaelli 
2017). 
7.4 Main observations from the literature review 
1. Advance the implementation of the IIA, namely regarding (EPRS 
2018): 
(a) information-sharing when negotiating and concluding 
international agreements;  
(b) the non-binding criteria for delineation of delegated and 
implementing acts; 
(c) the Council’s reluctance to accept the use of delegated 
acts; 
(d) the need of a better flow of information from the Council; 
(e) the need of greater efforts to set up a joint database on the 
state of play of legislative acts; 
(f) MSs' transparency about 'gold-plating'; 
(g) the promotion of a greater use of IAs by the EP committees 
whenever needed. 
2. Include in the IIA a procedure to structure the oversight of 
legislation. This would also improve the democratic accountability of 
implementation by reinforcing the role of the EP (De Feo 2017).  
3. The EC should give a proper reason and pre-alert the other 
institutions about its intentions to withdraw a legislative proposal 
during the submission and the discussion of its Work Programme 
(Lupo 2017). 
4. It is up to MSs to decide whether to become simple suppliers of 
pieces of information and data or more active players of the EU's 
regulatory policy cycle through a more effective use of tools like IA 
and evaluation that can integrate the usual negotiations (Sarpi 2015). 
 74 
5. Indicate that the BR 2015 does not intend to disrespect the place 
of the consultative bodies (EESC and CoR) as part of the EU 
institutional design73 (Willems 2016). 
6. Promoting the BR as an instrument of coherence with long-term 
goals (especially SDGs) would improve the salience of IA and 
evaluations in the eyes of the EP and the Council74. 
 
                                           
(73)  In particular, since the CoR has been granted legal standing before the CJEU to protect its 
prerogatives, depending on the institutional practise in consulting the EESC and the CoR, 
the latter could bring a case to the CJEU (Willems 2016). 
(74)  Ashford, N. and A. Renda (2016), 'Aligning Policies for Low-Carbon Systemic Innovation in 
Europe', CEPS-i24c report, cited in (Renda 2017a). 
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8 Subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of 
the BR  
8.1 [Achievements] A possibility to broaden the 
application of subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles… 
1. The BR 2015 seems to provide a possibility to broaden the pre-
legislative cooperation between EU institutions and NPs (Jancic 
2015). 
2. The IIA seems to honour the role of NPs in scrutinising the EC’s 
legislative planning (the earlier IIAs did not even mention them) 
(Jancic 2015). 
3. Instruments provided by the BR 2015 (namely IAs) could be a useful 
guidance on how to conceptualise the very broad concept of the 
proportionality principle in the judicial review of the EU 
legislation (i.e. help to give a legal meaning) (Maśnicki 2016). This is 
because the Guidelines provide a structured approach for the IA 
process. In fact, the CJEU’s case law shows that the Court uses the 
IAs in order to help and bolster its assessment of the 
proportionality/subsidiarity of the EU’s legislative measure. This 
increased review by the CJEU might in turn lead to pressure for more 
meaningful IAs (Nowag and Groussot 2018). 
4. The BR 2015 and the IIA are among the milestones that have led to 
the CoR's commitment to impose a territorial dimension on the IA 
framework (Taulègne 2017). 
5. The BR 2015 addresses a number of the shortcomings of the old 
program concerning the conceptualisation and practice of private 
regulation75 in the EU (Verbruggen 2017)76. 
  
                                           
(75) In the Better Regulation Toolbox (2017, p.109), co-regulation is defined as 'a mechanism 
whereby the Union legislator entrusts the attainment of specific policy objectives set out in 
legislation or other policy documents to parties which are recognised in the field (such as 
economic operators, social partners, non-governmental organizations, or associations)'. 
'Self-regulation is where business or industry sectors formulate codes of conduct or 
operating constraints on their own initiative for which they are responsible for enforcing. 
However, pure self-regulation is uncommon and at the EU level it generally involves the 
Commission in instigating or facilitating the drawing up of the voluntary agreement.' 
(76) The BR 2015 Guidelines provide a reference to the principles for better self- and co-
regulation drafted by a forum of stakeholders. The principles concern a number of 
conditions for the adoption, governance and implementation of self- and co-regulation, 
including matters of participation, transparency, (legal) compliance, IA and funding. These 
conditions may be taken as parameters for answering the policy question of when and 
under what conditions private regulation may be deployed as a policy alternative 
(Verbruggen 2017). 
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8.2 [Issues] …but the evidence use and a systemic 
vision behind these principles are still lacking 
1. The implicit problem assumption is unfounded (Garben 2018). 
(a) The factual basis for the assumption that the EU lacks 
respect for the subsidiarity principle is unclear. However, 
since it remains possible for the EU to act in virtually any policy 
area, this problem assumption can be accepted. 
(b) There is little evidence of a fundamental tendency to 
disrespect proportionality in the legislative process. 
Furthermore, the Court has been willing to strike down EU 
legislation that does breach proportionality, and the Early 
Warning System adds political control of this principle to the MS 
toolbox. 
Therefore, given that there is no evidence-based need to solve the 
proportionality problem in the EU, the BR seems a rather 
disproportionate and unnecessary exercise. 
2. However, other authors state that in some cases the EC does not act 
in compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, by assuming powers that lie outside the scope of 
those provided by TFEU (Bartlett 2018) 77. 
3. In IAs, the argument of the respect for the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality is not underpinned by the usage of 
evidence-based instruments (Impact Assessment Institute 2017; 
Radaelli 2018). In the past, there is evidence that the IAB used to 
prefer a procedural interpretation of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality to legal and economic interpretations (Meuwese, 
A., Gomtsian 2015)78. 
4. The IA can be said to have two functions in the context of the 
proportionality requirement (Nowag and Groussot 2018):  
(a) as a procedural element (Nowag and Groussot 2018);  
(b) for substantive assessment of proportionality, since it 
provides additional material and arguments for examining and 
justifying why the measure is proportional (Nowag and Groussot 
2018). 
i. In the current state of affairs, it seems to rather 
provide a 'shield against judicial review' with the danger 
of becoming a box-ticking exercise (Dawson 2016; 
Nowag and Groussot 2018). 
                                           
(77) The author refers to Article 290 TFEU on delegated acts which can be adopted by the EC 
only within the strict parameters set by the delegating EU legislation. 
(78)  Meuwese and Gomtsian (2015) present an analysis of opinions from the IAB from 2010  and 
2011. See Annex 3 for details. 
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ii. Extending the adjudicative scope of subsidiarity and 
proportionality to a more substantive review is 
extremely difficult without undermining the margin 
of discretion granted to the EU institutions in 
adopting legislation (Nowag and Groussot 2018). 
5. There is a risk that the EU falls into two traps (Van den Abeele 
2015): 
(a) invoking subsidiarity to justify the EU’s legislative abstinence 
and renationalising, or even re-regionalising, could lead to the 
disintegration of the EU by weakening the acquis 
communautaire; 
(b) replacing the co-legislators and social partners with experts, 
private consultants and other stakeholders attacks the 
'Community method' by delegitimising the EP and the 
Council. 
6. In the name of subsidiarity, the BR 2015 actually promotes and 
encourages less democratic forms of EU integration, especially 
soft law: indirectly, policy-makers in the EC, to avoid having to 
engage in arduous IA and being examined by the RSB, could tend to 
opt for a soft law initiative. It is open for debate whether soft law is 
more in line with the subsidiarity principle than legislation is (Garben 
2018).  
7. There is a sidelining of private regulation in the BR 2015 (Renda 
2016; Verbruggen 2017).  
(a) There is a lack of overarching vision for the role of co- and 
self-regulation on the part of the EU institutions. Private actors 
such as trade associations, NGOs and other public interest 
groups might be put off to engage with the EU legislature or MSs 
to construe clear, integrated and ‘mixed’ approaches to 
regulation (Verbruggen 2017). 
(b) While the BR Toolbox does currently mention the possibility to 
combine the full range of policy options, the new IA Guidelines 
fall short of providing guidance on how to combine 
alternative policy instruments or combine EU legislative 
measures and such alternatives. Co- and self-regulation are 
regarded as ‘alternatives to’ EU legislative action, thereby 
neglecting the possibility to design a mix of regulatory 
instruments in which private regulation complements EU 
legislation (Verbruggen 2017). 
8. While co- and self-regulation undoubtedly have several advantages, 
they also present clear shortcomings. From this perspective, the BR 
2015 seems to encourage forms of regulation that escape 
traditional legal and political accountability mechanisms. In the 
case of the European standardisation process, the participatory 
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possibilities do not ensure sufficient ex-ante control and the current 
system of judicial protection does not fully work (Eliantonio 2017). 
9. NPs occupy a fairly peripheral place in the BR 2015 (Jancic 
2015). The BR 2015 itself has not promoted any form of engagement 
for NPs in the evaluation of the added value of EU legislation that is 
already in force (Griglio 2017). Unlike that of stakeholders, their 
involvement therein has not been formalised (Auel 2017; Jancic 
2015). Compared to these expectations, the BR 2015 has been 
considered to be a sort of 'missed opportunity' for introducing new 
forms of involvement by NPs (Auel 2017). Some examples: 
(a) the BR Guidelines specifically state that stakeholders 
consultations do not apply to opinions of NPs. Conversely, 
the BR Toolbox does envisage contributions from public 
authorities, among which NPs, without providing any further 
information about it (Auel 2017; Jancic 2015); 
(b) the formal institutional position of NPs remains restricted 
to ex-ante subsidiarity control of draft EU legislative acts 
(Early Warning System), whose effectiveness is questionable. It 
excludes non-legislative acts that might only be scrutinized by 
NPs through the Political Dialogue, yet without being able to 
create any legal consequences (Auel 2017; Jancic 2015); 
(c) the REFIT Platform does not include NPs (Auel 2017; Jancic 
2015); 
(d) in light of the strong pressure that a large number of NPs are 
putting on the EC for the latter, to accept an ‘enhanced political 
dialogue’ in the form of a ‘green card’ for initiating or 
repealing EU legislation, the BR 2015 appears as a missed 
opportunity to address these requests (Auel 2017; Jancic 
2015); 
(e) the IIA seems to sideline NPs because their reactions are only 
officially solicited once the IA process has been 
completed (Auel 2017; Jancic 2015); 
(f) in spite of increasing progress in the institutionalisation of IA 
and in the call for greater interinstitutional participation, the 
contribution of NPs to the implementation of the procedure is 
still uncertain, partly due to persisting disagreements on the 
role and status of IA in the European legislative process (Griglio 
2017); 
(g) involvement of NPs – and regional parliaments for matters 
within their competence – in the comprehensive evaluation, 
several years after the legislation has been implemented, risks 
complicating the process of the political decision and action 
(Van den Abeele 2015). 
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8.3 Main observations from the literature review 
1. The CJEU should further recognise the BR 2015 as establishing the 
guidelines on how the proportionality should be conceptualised 
(Maśnicki 2016). 
2. Improve the coherence of subsidiarity and proportionality 
analysis by using sound evidence and arguments. In particular, 
the assessed impacts, for example in terms of costs and benefits, are 
a direct indicator of proportionality (Impact Assessment Institute 
2017).  
3. A rather weak review of subsidiarity, both in political as well as legal 
assessment, in terms of substantive and procedural assessment, 
could be improved by taking the requirements for IA (as expressed in 
the BR Guidelines and Toolbox) more seriously (Nowag and Groussot 
2018).  
(a) The CJEU would need to ensure that the BR Guidelines as 
well as the actual IA are compliant with the requirements 
of the EU Treaties. 
(b) A feedback loop could be created: the CJEU improved use of IA 
would lead to improved and more frequent use of IA. 
4. Subject all soft-law initiatives to compulsory IA (an alternative 
that would better serve both subsidiarity and democracy) (Garben 
2018). 
5. Achieving a more systematic use of territorial IAs in EU policy 
making needs a more systematic partnership approach by the EC and 
the EP (Taulègne 2017). 
6. In the interest of a powerful subsidiarity principle, the RSB should 
go deeper into the substance of impacts and the details of 
methodology (Meuwese, A., Gomtsian 2015). 
7. The role of MSs in the process should be strengthened (e.g. 
guidance on implementation, a constant interaction between the NPs 
and the EU authorities, and IAs of pending dossiers on national 
interests) (Renda 2016). 
8. Strengthen the role of the NPs.  
(a) Reinforce the involvement of NPs in the early stages of EU 
decision-making (Griglio 2017). 
(b) Institutionalize ‘green cards’ to provide NPs with an active 
and more constructive involvement in EU law-making and to 
encourage NPs to assess existing EU legislation (Auel 2017).  
(c) The EU institutions, and the EC in particular, need to be willing 
to take NPs’ input into account (Auel 2017). 
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(d) NPs could make more active use of the opportunities for 
pre- and ex-post legislative scrutiny available to them (Auel 
2017). 
(e) Strengthen NPs’ oversight of the national government 
represent an indirect means of strengthening their involvement 
in EU policy-making  (Griglio 2017). 
9. Enrich interparliamentary (between national and regional 
assemblies) and interinstitutional dialogue on IA (share national 
positions and views on the impact of EU legislation both in the pre-
legislative and legislative stages, and in the monitoring of EU law 
implementation and transposition) (Griglio 2017). 
10. Set up follow-up requirements (either binding or relying on 
informal interinstitutional practices) to which executives (the EC and 
national governments) are bound. A key part of the process lies in 
governmental accountability to parliament on IA work conducted by 
parliamentary scrutiny bodies (Griglio 2017). 
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9 Concluding remarks 
Assessing the BR 2015 is not an easy exercise79. Firstly, the BR is not a 
question of quick fixes or miracle cures (Voermans 2016). Since the 
legislative cycles of the EU take substantial time, it will take several years 
before the outcome of the agenda can be evaluated fully (Impact 
Assessment Institute 2017). Secondly, systematic evaluation of the 
regulatory quality policies is a difficult exercise (Voermans 2016). 
Compliance with formal procedural rules is (maybe) a necessary condition for 
the BR to work, but not a sufficient one (Wegrich 2015). Decisions on 
legislation are political, so it is difficult to assess if the BR 2015 helped 
producing better policy results or contributed to decision-making (Golberg 
2018). Evaluation is made difficult also by the complex, multi-faceted 
nature of the BR 2015 (with many incarnations over time, different features 
and objectives), and by its impact also on the other institutional actors 
(Garben and Govaere 2018). At the same time, the BR is influenced by 
external pressure, such as international negotiations (Alemanno 2015; 
Dawson 2016). Finally, the causal link between the BR and the quality of 
EU rules is a fascinating yet elusive object of study since there is no 
counterfactual of how EU legislation would look if the BR did not exist 
(Radaelli 2018). In the absence of agreed indicators, it is difficult to 
draw definitive conclusions on performance of the BR (Golberg 2018). 
The debates on the BR appear to be somewhat ‘disparate and 
impoverished’, yet are likely to have an influence on public attitudes towards 
EU integration, such as in the case of the recent Brexit vote (Garben and 
Govaere 2018). The complaints about the (too high or too low) level of EU 
regulation are often of a political nature (Delogu 2016; Garben and 
Govaere 2018; Golberg 2018; Maśnicki 2016; Wegrich 2015). In contrast 
with this polarised discussion, the EU institutions seem instead to prefer a 
depoliticised approach, presenting the BR as neutral evidence-based 
policy-making and a balanced approach (Delogu 2016; Garben and 
Govaere 2018). However, not all commentators perceive this approach 
positively since it seems to limit the inherently political dimension of 
the EU decision-making process (Willermain and Cioriciu 2015). 
Nevertheless, some authors observe enduring politicisation despite the 
commitment to evidence-based policy-making, with tools and procedures 
having the potential to be used according to political logics (Eliantonio 
and Spendzharova 2017).  
The academic and expert debate addresses a wide range of aspects, 
at both technical and political level. The presence of little consensus in some 
cases, together with the lack of empirical evidence, makes the attempt of a 
synthesis extremely challenging.  
The great majority of the publications welcome the ambition of the reform 
and at least one or more specific aspects of the BR 2015, which are seen 
as further strengthening the EU regulation system. These are notably the 
reliance on evidence-based policy-making, the attempt at closing the policy 
cycle by paying more attention to the evaluation phase, the increased 
                                           
(79)  See section 5.3. 
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responsiveness to stakeholders, a greater role of scrutiny, transparency, 
consideration for subsidiarity. Many authors recognize that the BR 2015 tries 
to address the most relevant criticisms and the difficulties encountered in the 
past.  
OECD (2018) defines the EU as the most ambitious regional regulatory 
co-operation framework involving supranational regulatory powers. 
However, while the actual implementation is a key issue (as shown by 
the remarks reported in the previous sections), many critical elements 
emerge at a more general level, as well. While the term 'better' implies an 
evaluation element, this doesn’t necessarily mean that it delivers high-
quality regulation, or that the very notion of regulatory quality is accepted by 
every player. Objectively, the BR 2015 is one possible incarnation of some 
ideas about regulatory reform and the governance of EU legislation (Radaelli 
2018). One of the main questions is how to reconcile the increasing tension 
in the EU between different paradigms of regulation. Regulation can be 
‘better’ because it conforms to the political preferences of citizens or because 
it meets technical standards, able to improve its ‘objective’ quality. The EU 
has two avenues to respond, which are both observed in the debate: to 
double down on the regulatory model or to replace it with a more 
transparent political way of defining the BR (Dawson 2016). In this choice, 
the EC may be constrained by external pressure (Alemanno 2015; Dawson 
2016). Some authors argue instead that the tools and procedures of the BR 
2015 will be used and gamed according to political logics, and that the 
justification of political choices with BR tools will contribute to the further 
‘technocratisation’ of EU policy-making (Wegrich 2015). It is noted that the 
BR Agenda further proceduralises EU policy-making, but still lacks 
homogeneity in its components (Alemanno 2015). Another critique is that 
the BR operates on the basis of several unproven assumptions, generates 
an enormous administrative burden, has serious cost implications and may 
overlook certain negative constitutional, social and environmental impacts by 
leaving gaps and circumventing possibly controversial topics (Garben 
and Govaere 2018; van Schagen 2017). It seems unlikely that the expected 
benefits can outweigh the costs (Garben and Govaere 2018). Others note 
that the EU Better Regulation Agenda is still coping with a number of 
existential dilemmas (for example, is it a cost-cutting agenda or a policy-
coherence agenda?); existing imperfections in the policy cycle; and 
governance problems (Renda 2017a). Authors also point to some 
contradictory elements of the BR 2015, such as the one between the aims to 
streamline policy-making and the ambition to ensure meaningful consultation 
(Eliantonio and Spendzharova 2017). 
 
On this basis, the following recommendations are made: 
1. Make a full and timely independent evaluation of the BR 2015 
(Impact Assessment Institute 2017). 
(a) Improve monitoring and reporting on the BR, both for the 
EC, the EP and the Council (Impact Assessment Institute 2017), 
as well as in cooperation with the MSs (Golberg 2018).  
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(b) Clarify the evidence base for the postulated problems the BR 
2015 tries to address and be able to prove its own ‘added value’ 
(Garben 2018).  
(c) Abandon the Commission-centric approach. To measure 
progress, the focus has to be on the MSs and stakeholders 
(Impact Assessment Institute 2017). 
2. Actions on the BR need to be more widely communicated by 
the EC, the other European institutions, the MSs and the many 
organisations that are active in the process (Golberg 2018) 
3. Develop a renewed narrative. 
(a) The EU does not regulate to impose costs, but to bring 
benefits (Golberg 2018; Radaelli 2018).  
(b) Address citizens’ pressures and perceptions of 
deficiencies in EU rule-making (Garben and Govaere 2018). 
The success of the BR depends also on the regain of confidence 
of all sides of the civil society, achieved through a balanced 
implementation approach (Delogu 2016). 
4. Ensure strong political commitment by the EU and the MSs, and 
administrative discipline in applying the BR (Cărăuşan 2016; 
Delogu 2016; Golberg 2018). Prompt and constructive co-operation is 
required from all of the actors participating and benefitting from 
policy-making, including stakeholders and Think Tanks (Meads and 
Allio 2015). 
5. Adapt the BR strategy to the changing nature of EU law-making which 
is increasingly focusing on implementation by direct EU-level 
institutions instead of secondary legislation implemented by MSs 
(Meads and Allio 2015).  
6. For the next EC, primary issues are the relation between 
subsidiarity and the BR; the relation between regulation and 
innovation; the evolution of the RSB; the added value of the IIA; 
the delivery of a set of robust evaluations (Radaelli 2018). 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Criteria for the literature search 
To focus on the changes introduced by the BR 2015, the literature search 
includes only publications issued from 2015 onwards. The last update was 
made in September 201880.  
The search, which has been kept as comprehensive as possible but 
nonetheless cannot be meant to be exhaustive, was launched in Scopus and 
Google Scholar in English by using the search terms 'better regulation' and 
'european commission'; 'impact assessment' and 'evaluation' and 'better 
regulation'; 'better regulation' and 'transparency'; 'better 
regulation'  and  'eu'; 'regulatory scrutiny board'. 
In addition, we considered academic journals which deal regularly with the 
BR; papers from academics and universities specializing on various BR 
topics; Think-Tanks’ websites and other sources such as the EPRS and the 
ECA.  
The list of references includes notably: 
1. peer reviewed articles in academic journals;  
2. book chapters;  
3. studies and notes of the EPRS;  
4. reports of the ECA; 
5. OECD reports; 
6. working papers;  
7. workshop proceedings. 
Publications by interest groups were not considered. Publications by the EC 
were also not taken into account, since the EC is part of the system this 
literature aims to assess (an exception is constituted by reports by the RSB 
and the JRC, which have been referenced when relevant). It is however 
possible that some of the authors of the papers retained might have had 
previous experience in the EU institutions.  
The full list of reviewed literature includes 104 contributions, which were 
all screened and shortlisted. The papers which directly address and discuss in 
an analytical way one or more elements of the changes introduced with the 
BR 2015 were retained, while, on the contrary, papers not making any 
reference to the BR 2015 or having a purely descriptive character were not 
considered. If relevant to the current debate, also papers addressing aspects 
related to the BR system before 2015 were taken into account. Overall, 76 
papers were included in the review (the full list is presented in Annex 2, 
together with the relevant topics they address), while 28 were not retained 
further. 
                                           
80  The only exception is constituted by (OECD 2018), which was published online on 10 
October 2018. 
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The academic fields of reference of the collected literature turned out to be 
mainly related to political science, public administration, and law. It is 
interesting to notice that other research areas, which can nonetheless also 
be deeply involved in BR related activities (such as economics, as far as IA 
and evaluation activities are concerned) are represented in this debate in a 
rather limited way. 
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Annex 3. Empirical studies81 
 
Author 
Methodological 
approach 
Year(s) of 
reference 
of empirical 
data 
Aim / short description 
Bunea 
(2017) 
Mixed methods 2012, 2014 The author examines stakeholders’ 
evaluation of the consultation regime 
expressed in two EC public consultations in 
2012 and 2014. The aim is to understand if 
this reinforced bias in interest representation 
by benefiting policy insiders, or conversely 
created conditions that alleviated bias in 
supranational policy-making.  
Bunea and 
Ibenskas 
(2017) 
Mixed methods 2012 This research deals with stakeholders' 
expectations expressed in the open EC 
consultation on the BR. The authors 
mapped the preferences of different actors – 
namely national authorities, cross-sectoral 
business organisations, sectoral businesses, 
public interest organisations and professional 
associations – on what type of regulatory 
reform BR measures should achieve. The 
analysis refers to the ‘Stakeholders 
Consultation on Smart Regulation in the EU’ 
organised by the European executive in 
2012. 
Bürgin 
(2018) 
Qualitative 2015-2017 The author aims to analyse the effectiveness 
of Juncker’s organisational changes in 
contributing to both the centralisation of 
leadership inside the EC, as well as 
providing an assessment of the EC’s 
leadership in the interinstitutional 
relations with the two co-legislators. To this 
end, interviews were conducted with 37 
experienced officials from the EC, the Council 
and the EP. 
  
                                           
(81)  An empirical study is here considered as a study that uses scientific research methodology to analyse 
systematically observed or measured phenomena.  
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Author 
Methodological 
approach 
Year(s) of 
reference 
of empirical 
data 
Aim / short description 
ECA (2018) Mixed methods 2013-2016 The ECA assesses whether the EU system 
of ex-post review of legislation has been 
properly planned, implemented, managed 
and quality-controlled. The audit covers 133 
ex-post reviews carried out between 2013 
and 2016 by four DGs of the EC, as well as 
all legislation and IAs adopted between 2014 
and 2016. 
Mastenbroe
k et al. 
(2016) 
Quantitative 2000-2012 The authors conduct a meta evaluation of 
the coverage and quality of ex-post 
legislative evaluations by the EC using 
two novel datasets containing, respectively, 
216 evaluations commissioned or conducted 
by the EC from 2000 to 2012 and 156 major 
EU directives and regulations adopted from 
2000 through 2002. 
(Meuwese, 
A., 
Gomtsian 
2015) 
Mixed methods 2010-2011 The authors present an analysis of opinions 
by the IAB from 2010 (70) and 2011 (149) 
as an alternative jurisprudential source 
regarding subsidiarity and proportionality. 
The authors look in particular at the way in 
which the Board conducts scrutiny for 
compatibility with these principles. 
Renda 
(2016) 
Mixed methods 2003-2011 The author identifies 53 IAs conducted in 
the financial sector in the years 2003-
2011 and scrutinises 36 of them by 
conducting a scorecard analysis in order to 
assess the methodology used for assessing 
impacts. 
Renda 
(2017) 
Qualitative - The author explores the methodological and 
political feasibility of 14 possible options for 
the setting of net reduction targets on 
regulatory costs in Europe. The study, 
commissioned by RegWatchEurope, is based 
on both desk research and interviews carried 
out with MSs' representatives as well as EC 
officials. 
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Author 
Methodological 
approach 
Year(s) of 
reference 
of empirical 
data 
Aim / short description 
Smismans 
and Minto 
(2017) 
Mixed methods 2011-2014 The authors assess whether the EU's IA 
system contributes to the realisation of six 
mainstreamed objectives defined in the EU 
treaties. They analyse 35 IAs to assess the 
extent to which mainstreamed objectives 
are taken into account in practice. 
Van Voorst 
and Zwaan 
(2018) 
Qualitative 2008-2012 The authors address the variation in the 
instrumental use of evaluation by the EC. 
Three high-quality evaluations are studied 
in-depth to assess the influence of political 
factors on their use. 
van Golen 
and van 
Voorst 
(2016) 
Mixed methods 2000-2014 The authors combine a dataset of 309 ex-
post legislative evaluations (2000-2014) and 
a dataset of 225 IAs of legislative updates 
(2003-2014) to show how many 
evaluations of the EC use IAs and vice 
versa. They also investigate the hypotheses 
that the timeliness, quality and focus of the 
IAs and evaluations are key explanations for 
their use. 
Weber, 
Edwards, 
and Huber 
(2017) 
Mixed methods 2004-2015 The authors analyse in review clauses and 
conducted reviews, the terminology used, 
timing, content, implementation, costs and 
impact on existing legislation on the EC’s 
annual work programme. The analysis draws 
on a desk-based review. The analysis covers 
501 pieces of legislation, which together 
mandate 681 reviewing obligations. 60 of 
these 501 pieces of legislation have led to 72 
review documents which are publicly 
accessible. 
Zwaan et 
al. (2016)   
Quantitative 2000-2012 The authors address the question of to what 
extent and when Members of the EP use 
evaluations. They present an analysis of 
220 evaluations, studying how many were 
referred to in parliamentary questions. They 
use the dame data set as in (Mastenbroek et 
al. 2016). 
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-
union/contact_en). 
  
 
K
J-N
A
-2
9
6
9
1
-E
N
-N
 
doi:10.2760/46617
ISBN 978-92-76-00840-8
